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Articles
Faithful Unions
REBECCA AVIEL*
We live in a moment of intense preoccupation with both marriage and federalism, one
that is likely to persist well beyond the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell
v. Hodges. The decision served to reify marriage as a site of enormous cultural
significance, an appropriate institution within which to fight over social meaning and
its reflection in law. These battles are fought state by state, against a backdrop of
unprecedented geographic mobility, raising profound questions not only about how
states relate to their own citizens, but how states relate to each other. If it is true that
states have an interest in marriages they have created, an idea often invoked but less
frequently examined, then interstate marriage recognition is a matter not only of
individual rights but also of state sovereignty. Yet the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
constitutional command that is seemingly most suited to managing marriage
federalism, has never been called into action.
This Article first suggests that this warrants explanation and then endeavors to
provide one. It offers an account of contingent doctrinal evolution, demonstrating that
the work the Clause might do in regulating interstate marriage recognition has so far
been done by other doctrines. But it also explains why the Clause might nonetheless
be useful for the marriage controversies of the future. The anti-animus principles that
drove marriage equality forward are highly dynamic; they reflect and respond to
social change in an iterative process that is neither linear, nor predictable, nor
instantaneous. While this unfolds for any given marriage controversy, over a period
that might take decades, we would advance our commitment to faithful unionsboth
marital and nationalby developing an interstate recognition scheme with
constitutional parameters.

* Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article takes on a puzzle in the ongoing constitutionalization of
marriage.1 Marriage has become one of the central civil rights issues of
our time, but the most intense national controversies over state marriage
policy seem to deflect rather than facilitate resolution of interstate
recognition issues. During the period that any given marriage
controversy wends its way through state and federal courts and
legislatures, yielding a patchwork of divergent state marriage laws, the
question of interstate recognition is a very pressing one.2 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has never explained whether Article IV’s Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires states to recognize the marriage acts of other
states. Instead, when a controversy over marriage reaches a certain point
of national salience, the Court (after waiting it out for a while) goes

1. Numerous scholars have explored the idea that marriage and family law have become
constitutionalized. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L. Q.
529, 529 (2008) (noting that “[a]mong the forces transforming American family law over the last fifty
years, perhaps none has been more salient than the field’s ‘constitutionalization.’”); see also Mary
Anne Case, Feminist Constitutionalism and the Constitutionalism of Marriage, in FEMINIST
FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MARRIAGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (Beverly
Baines et al. eds., 2012).
2. Other commentators have capably explained this urgency. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer,
Same-sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 6
(2005) (explaining why it is “essential that we face squarely the arguments on both sides of this debate
about whether states have a constitutional obligation to recognize same-sex marriages validly
performed elsewhere.”); Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of
Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005).
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directly to the substantive Fourteenth Amendment principles: what do
Equal Protection and Due Process require of states in issuing marriage
licenses? The Court has declined to impose any Article IV parameters on
how states relate to each other during times of pervasive disagreement
over the proper contours of the marriage relationship.3
That is not to say that this would be an easy or straightforward
endeavor, as those familiar with choice of law doctrine will appreciate.
Scholars in this field have long asserted, over some vigorous and
persuasive objections,4 that the Full Faith and Credit Clause has no
bearing on the interstate recognition of marriage.5 Distilled to its
essential elements, the thesis is that in spite of its plain text, the clause’s
operational scope has historically been limited to the interstate
recognition of judgments, and that the management of interstate
marriage conflicts falls to ordinary, non-constitutional choice of law
principles.6 As one commentator has described, adherents of the
3. This is made all the more perplexing given the Court’s emphasis on the importance of its role
in enforcing federalism principles. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding a nationwide gun control act was an overreach of
Congressional powers). To be sure, the Court has recently been more vocal about vertical federalism
principles, the enforcement of the boundary between federal and state power. But it has also
emphasized the importance of horizontal federalism, the appropriate management of interstate
relationships, to the constitutional design. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,
439 (1943) (describing the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a “nationally unifying force” transforming
the states from “independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created
under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others . . . .”).
4. See, e.g., Habib A. Balian, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397 (1995); J. Stephen Clark, Conflicts Originalism: The “Original
Content” of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Compulsory Choice of Marriage Law, 118 W. VA.
L. REV. 547, 549 (2015) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been left seriously underenforced as a
constitutional constraint on state choice of law.”); Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be
Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v.
Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 584 (1993); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of
Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1967 (1997) (asserting
that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits states from selectively discriminating in choice of law
based on judgments about the desirability or obnoxiousness of other states’ policies.”). Kramer’s work
is especially interesting in retrospect, having been written in the very early stages of legislative activity
and ballot initiatives that targeted same-sex marriage for special rules of nonrecognition.
5. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 363 (2005) [hereinafter Borchers, The
Essential Irrelevance]; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full
Faith and Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1981); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981). Arguments that
states must recognize valid marriages performed in other states were treated in this literature as a kind
of rookie mistake: “It always worries me a little when the Conflict of Laws suddenly seems interesting.
When outsiders begin to visit this little corner of the legal universe, the results usually are not good.”
Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of NonTraditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 147 (1998).
6. As neatly captured in one rendition: “Only judgments are entitled to near automatic
recognition . . . a marriage is not a ‘judgment’ (at least of the relevant kind), but rather, it is a state
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conventional wisdom project an air of certainty about this premise that
is outright disdainful for suggestions to the contrary.7
If it is “preposterous”8 to consider the application of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to the interstate recognition of marriage, no one told
the Supreme Court. During the oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges,
the justices repeatedly asked counsel to do exactly that. Justice Scalia,
inverting the conventional wisdom sketched out above, proclaimed that
it was the Full Faith and Credit Clause, rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment, “that actually seems to be relevant.”9 Justice Roberts
emphasized the lack of precedent directly considering the marriage
question and pressed counsel to identify any case that could be said to
dispose of the possibility that marriage licenses were entitled to Full
Faith and Credit.10
In a high profile, ideologically fraught case that few expected to yield
any real surprises, this line of questioning was unexpected and
interesting. Had the conflicts scholars been wrong to conclude so
forcefully that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not apply to marriage?
Would the conservative justices find themselves bound by the text of the
Full Faith and Credit clause to order the recognition of same-sex
marriages? The moment passed with little lasting consequence, however,
when the majority ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon
every state an obligation to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples,
completely overshadowing the question of interstate recognition. None
of the dissenters who objected to the majority’s view of Equal Protection
and Due Process suggested that they would have required Ohio or
Tennessee to recognize valid same-sex marriages from other states
pursuant to the demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It was
difficult to know who, exactly, had been vindicated by the Justices’
intense but short-lived interest in the relationship between marriage and
the Full Faith and Credit clause.
The Full Faith and Credit clause’s proper application to interstate
marriage recognition thus remains unresolved, perhaps restoring to
primacy the conflicts scholars’ assessment that it is largely irrelevant.
This supposed irrelevance, however, continues to be a bit puzzling,
licensed and sanctioned arrangement entered into under the umbrella of a statute. A marriage,
therefore, is a sister-state public act, and historically the Supreme Court has not required states to give
full faith and credit to such acts.” WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 125–26 (2005).
7. Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex Marriage?:
Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95 (2014).
8. Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 479 (2005)
(“The subject of same-sex marriage has produced a seemingly endless set of preposterous ideas about
why the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to give effect to marriages performed in other
states.”).
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556).
10. Id. at 28, 35–36.
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especially in light of the skepticism with which it was received by the
justices during oral argument in Obergefell. One need not be a
full-throated textualist to observe that the text of the clause is difficult to
reconcile with the meager force of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
historically applied to marriages.11 It bears some emphasis in a
constitutional culture such as ours, where textualism still has such
purchase, that this rewriting of the clause is particularly heavy-handed,
rendering null two of the enumerated items in a list of three.12 On the
other hand, constitutional doctrines are replete with departures from
textualism, and the Constitution itself includes some provisions for
which the literal reading would be more or less absurd.13 As has been
noted, a literal reading of the Full Faith and Credit clause might be
similar, in that requiring a state to give effect to all “Acts” of a sister state
would eviscerate its authority to regulate in divergent ways.14 Thus, the
Supreme Court has imposed a rather minimal constitutional obligation
when it comes to state choice of law decisions in cases involving tort
liability, contract enforcement, and workplace regulation.15 Marriage,
however, presents some distinctive interstate recognition questions that
are not necessarily answered by this line of cases.16 The proper resolution
of the question is not obvious, and there are reasons to wonder how the
Court would (and should) ultimately resolve it. What this Article seeks to
explain is why the Court has never done so. How has this gone
unanswered for so long? To state the obvious, it is not for lack of
opportunity.
In this Article, I seek to explain why these questions remain
unanswered after such prolonged and intensive focus on the
constitutional implications of state marriage policy. Questions of

11. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 290 (1992) (explaining the operation of the
Clause as to interstate recognition of judgments, and observing that “[a]s a simple matter of
constitutional text, the Clause must have the same meaning with respect to rules of law.”).
12. Although one might accept that “Public Acts” includes the statutes of sister states,
acknowledging the plain meaning of the text, and yet still posit that the “faith” or “credit” due to a
sister state statute is different than what is due to a sister state judgment; in other words, that statutes
are not read out of the Clause but simply require a different type of regard.
13. For a favorite example, see Amar’s discussion of vice presidents presiding over their own
impeachment trials. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 10–11 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1468, 1503 (2007) (“Read literally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests ‘the absurd result that,
wherever the conflict [between different states’ laws] arises, the statute of each state must be enforced
in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.’”) (quoting Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)).
15. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 43 (describing the Court’s approach in these
cases as one of “minimal scrutiny.”).
16. It is a status determination with an utterly unique set of ramifications for individual rights
and obligations. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 40.
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interstate marriage recognition implicate a tangled mix of principles
drawn from different doctrines. Thinking about marriage federalism
requires an understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, layered
upon “ordinary” (by which I mean non-constitutional) choice of law
principles, operating against a backdrop of Due Process and Equal
Protection guarantees.17
A conventional and perfectly valid appraisal of these doctrines
would take them in isolation, noting that they serve different purposes,
were borne out of different questions, and are appropriate to raise in
different fact patterns.18 These doctrines are not interdependent in any
formal sensewhat states choose to recognize under their ordinary
choice of law rules operates independently of what they are obligated to
do under the Full Faith and Credit clause,19 and of course their
obligations under that clause are not contingent upon their obligations
under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor the reverse. So it might violate
the Fourteenth Amendment to discriminate against same-sex couples in
the provision of marriage licenses even though it does not violate the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to refuse to recognize marriage licenses from
other states. Conversely, it is possible to imagine a universe in which the
Full Faith and Credit Clause required states to recognize marriage
licenses from sister states even where there was no Fourteenth
Amendment obligation to issue the same sort of license in the first
instance.20 It is thus entirely accurate to conceive of these doctrines as
distinct and independentnot reliant on, nor substitutes for, one
another.
This Article offers a different perspective, beginning with the
observation that all three of these doctrines are tools that in some way
serve to solve the social problem writ large: how to manage interstate
marriage recognition in a morally pluralistic, structurally federalist
17. And, as I will explore later in the Article, it raises even broader trans-substantive questions
about horizontal federalism and the role of Congress in resolving interstate conflicts.
18. William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, for example, posit that the “essence” of the
Due Process clause “is fairness to the individual, while the heart of full faith and credit is ensuring that
each state respects the rights of other states.” REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 39.
19. Justice Jackson cautioned against the temptation of treating the doctrines as interchangeable:
In considering claims of foreign law for faith and credit courts of course find conflict of laws
a relevant and enlightening body of experience and authority to provide analogies. But while
the American law of conflicts is a somewhat parallel and contemporaneous development
with the law of faith and credit, they also are quite independent evolutions, are based on
contrary basic assumptions, and at times support conflicting results. We must beware of
transposing conflicts doctrines into the law of the Constitution.
Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 30 (1945).
20. I acknowledge here the distinct contention that a couple validly married in one jurisdiction
has a Fourteenth Amendment right, sounding either in due process or equal protection, to the
continued validity of their marriage. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your)
Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2012).
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system with an increasingly mobile and inter-connected population.21
These doctrines are not deployed or developed in isolation, and this
Article will argue that what we are witnessing is a phenomenon of
contingent doctrinal evolution, whereby seemingly independent
doctrines develop or stagnate in response to what is happening in other
areas of law.22 The expansiveness of the “ordinary” choice of law
principles and the expanding scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection for marriage decisionmaking have crowded out the Full Faith
and Credit question. In a landscape where one has always been generous
and the other is becoming more so, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has
little to do23not because it is textually or conceptually inapt, but
because its practical, real-world work is being done by other doctrines.
This Article describes this phenomenon and explores its
implicationsfor rights, for federalism, and for both marital and
national unions.
Part I briefly reviews the debate over whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause should apply to interstate marriage recognition. It provides
an overview of the scholarly literature and a detailed look at the line of
inquiry pursued by the Justices during the Obergefell argument,
showcasing how profoundly unsettled the question continues to be. Part
II explores why the issue remains unresolved, introducing and
elaborating upon the concept of contingent doctrinal evolution. It
explains that “ordinary” choice of law principles foster the recognition of
most interstate marriages, making it unnecessary in the vast majority of
instances to determine a state’s constitutional obligations under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. As to those marriages that have fallen outside
the scope of these decidedly pro-recognition rulesinter-racial and
same-sex marriages chief among themwe have on the other hand an
increasingly robust set of Fourteenth Amendment principles working to
invalidate exclusionary marriage policies predicated on animus. Part II
also highlights the challenging structural questions presented by
Congress’s role as interstate relations manager, showing that these issues
complicate the development of interstate recognition principles
grounded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Part III considers whether,
21. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence
v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1274 (2004) (“The Jim Crow judges were horrifyingly wrong about
many things, but they did understand the problem of moral pluralism in a federal system, and we can
learn something important from the solutions that they devised.”).
22. For an example from another area of constitutional law, consider one scholar’s observation
that there was little need to determine the boundaries of Congress’s power to tax during the 60 years
that it had virtually unlimited power under the Commerce Clause. See Barry Cushman, NFIB
v. Sebelius and the Transformation of the Taxing Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 161 (2013).
23. One scholar posits that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “sits there, seemingly with nothing to
dobecause it has never been asked to do anything.” Sanders, supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis in
original). I concur with and draw from his capable analysis but offer a different explanation for the
Clause’s apparent powerlessness.
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in light of these phenomena, there will be work remaining for Full Faith
and Credit in future marriage controversies. It concludes that the answer
is yes, explaining that unconstitutional animus is not a terrain with fixed
boundariesit is contested, evolving, and responsive to social change.
Most importantly, such animus is easier to see in retrospect than while
social and legal change is unfolding. While the chronology of marriage
equality seems to reinforce the assumption that we can expect the
Fourteenth Amendment to do most of the work in policing state marriage
policy, we might nonetheless find it useful to call upon the Full Faith and
Credit Clause while the Fourteenth Amendment principles are being
worked out.
I. THE ROLE OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN INTERSTATE
MARRIAGE RECOGNITION
A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The outline of the problem is familiar: a couple gets married in one
state, then moves to another.24 Their union features some quality that
would render them ineligible to receive a marriage license in the second
state were they seeking to wed there in the first instance, but they are not
seeking the issuance of a new license. They simply seek to have the
second state recognize what the first state has already done, to give effect
to the status they have already achieved. What are the obligations of the
second state to honor an existing marriage license that it would have
refused to issue?
It seems that the Full Faith and Credit Clause pertains to this very
question.25 The text could hardly be more apt, ordaining that: “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Surely a state-issued marriage
license qualifies as a “public Act,” or at least a “Record?” Perusing the
minutia of state marriage procedure confirms the intuition, revealing all
manner of detail regarding the state’s matrimonial record keeping.26 And
24. As we will explore in much greater depth, the “migratory” couple described here is different
in profoundly important ways than a couple contracting an “evasive” marriage.
25. Kramer, supra note 4, at 1976 (the clause “looks on its face as if it were written for precisely
this sort of problem.”).
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-109 (2017). Notwithstanding this apparent fit, however, FFC
scholars have asserted that:
[T]he meaning of the term full faith and credit shifts as the focus changes from judicial
proceedings and acts to records. To give full faith and credit to another state’s judicial
proceedings is to give them preclusive effect according to the law of the rendering
state. . . . By contrast, to give full faith and credit to ‘records’ means simply to admit them
routinely into evidence in the courts of the forum.
REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis omitted). The fuller context reveals the
assumption that the records in question are judicial records. Reynolds and Richman treat the “records”
component (in combination with Congress’s implementing statute) as the mechanism by which courts
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when the issue of same-sex marriage was brought into the national
spotlight by litigation in Hawaii,27 reporters and commentators opined
that the Full Faith and Credit clause would require other states to
recognize such marriages.28
But Professor Andrew Koppelman, in what is perhaps the definitive
modern guide to interstate marriage conflicts, described this idea as a
“fundamental misconception.”29 The chapter devoted to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause proclaims the clause’s “irrelevance” to interstate
marriage recognition, using the same striking language as an article on
interstate marriage recognition from the previous year.30 The assertion
is defended by noting the dearth of judicial decisions imposing full faith
and credit obligations on states refusing to recognize out of state
marriages. Koppelman observes that “there is not a single judicial
decision that holds that full faith and credit requires states to recognize
marriages that violate their own public policies concerning who may
marry.”31 Instead, he explains, the force of the clause has historically been
admit and authenticate evidence of what a sister court has rendered.
27. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
28. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME-SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE
LINES 117 (2006) (describing such assertions as “feckless.”). It is worth noting that for scholars and
advocates sympathetic to the cause of marriage equality, as Koppelman certainly was, and therefore
eager to dispel the panic that accompanied the developments in Hawaii and Massachusetts, there may
have been strategic reasons to assure observers that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not spring
into action. See, e.g., Jay Michaelson, An Often-Overlooked Clause in the Constitution Points the Way
to
Same-sex
Marriage,
DAILY
BEAST
(Apr.
2,
2013,
4:45
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/02/an-often-overlooked-clause-in-the-constitution
-points-the-way-to-same-sex-marriage.html (opining that conservatives opposed to same-sex
marriage were invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a “scare tactic.”).
29. KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 118.
30. Koppelman criticized the media coverage of the same-sex marriage controversy for
“fecklessly” repeating “the claim that the full faith and credit clause will require every state to recognize
same-sex marriages.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 117. Such claims, it should be noted, were heard
in no less hallowed halls than the United States Congress, as Mark Strasser captures nicely in his article
on DOMA: “Members of Congress apparently feared that Hawaii would recognize same-sex marriage,
and that domiciliaries of other states would go to Hawaii, marry their same-sex partners, and then
return to their domiciles demanding that their marriages be recognized.” Mark Strasser, Windsor,
Federalism, and the Future of Marriage Litigation, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER ONLINE 1, 7 (2013); see
also id. at 7 n.64 (citing 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05, H7490) (Rep. Canady):
The idea of the gay rights legal advocacy community is that they will have same-sex
marriages recognized in the State of Hawaii, and then folks will go there from around the
country, be married under the laws of the State of Hawaii, and then go back to where they
came from and attempt to use the full faith and credit clause to force those States to which
they have returned to recognize the legality of that same-sex union contracted in the State
of Hawaii.
(citing 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05, H7486) (Rep. Buyer) (“When one State wants to move towards the
recognition of same-sex marriages, it is wrong. The full faith and credit of the Constitution would force
States like Indiana to abide by it. We as a Federal Government have a responsibility to act, and we will
act.”); see also Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5; Whitten, supra note 8, at 486.
31. KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 118. The explanatory footnote, however, tells a slightly more
complicated story, listing counter examples. Id. at 185 n.11. Koppelman notes that these exceptions
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limited to judgments. Marriage licenses, of course, no matter how
intricate the procedures used to formalize the union, simply cannot be
categorized as judgments. While states are constitutionally obligated to
give effect to the judgments of sister state courts, they are otherwise free,
for the most part, to apply their own choice of law principles to any given
dispute, with the result of choosing their own state’s substantive law.32
Koppelman and other conflicts scholars cite landmark cases such as
Sun Oil and Allstate for the principle that a state may apply its own law
to a dispute if the state “had a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”33 Scholars often cite
Nevada v. Hall for the proposition that states may refuse to apply a sister
state’s law when doing so would violate the forum state’s “legitimate
public policy.”34 Nevada v. Hall, it must be noted, was a personal injury
case concerning a state’s authority to apply its own damages law to a
dispute with a sister state defendant, thereby allowing a higher recovery
against the sister state defendant than the sister state’s own law would
allow. Similarly, treated as instructive is languagemost recently
reiterated in a products liability action brought against an automobile
manufacturerasserting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own
statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent
to legislate.”35 The use of such cases in this context reveals the pervasive
and usually unexplained assumption that the recognition of marriages is
conceptually equivalent to the other choice of law problems that confront
a court adjudicating a case with interjurisdictional contacts. This
assumption has proliferated beyond the academic literature, showing up

were limited to common law marriages, which he describes as presenting a formal rather than
substantive objection. But common law marriage was on occasion denied recognition on the grounds
that it was offense to the forum state’s “strong public policy,” suggesting substantive and not just
technical opposition. See, e.g., Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5, at 354 n.11 (citing
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961)) (refusing to recognize common-law
marriage because it would violate strong public policy of the forum). Another commentator identifies
one case in which a court applied full faith and credit principles to interstate marriage recognition, but
that case seemed to involve a common law marriage adjudicated to judgment. Balian, supra note 4, at
403 n.27 (citing Ram v. Ramharack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)) (holding that a commonlaw marriage validly consummated in another state or jurisdiction can be recognized in New York
under the doctrine of full faith and credit).
32. Note that the inquiry is often phrased to collapse two distinct questions: (1) which choice of
law methodology does a state use, and is that a fair method when assessed independently of which law
is ultimately selected; and (2) is it appropriate for a forum state to apply its own law?
33. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981). Cited in Koppelman, supra note 28, at
118 n.18 and REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 6, at 27.
34. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
35. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
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in lower court rulings,36 opinion letters,37 and other discussions of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application to interstate marriage
recognition.38 As will be explored in further detail, whether this
assumption will bear out remains an open question.
In any event, it is against this backdrop that eminent choice of law
scholars have concluded that questions of interstate marriage
recognition are choice of law problems, not constitutional ones; that this
is a realm in which state law reigns supreme and pretty much
unhindered. William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, for example,
describe it as “quite unlikely that the Supreme Court [would] strike down
any decision rendered by a state court that has conscientiously applied
any of the dominant choice of law methodologies,” noting the Court’s
“veneration of choice of law traditions” and the “ease” with which it
“manufactures” the requisite contacts.39
When it comes to the recognition of out-of-state marriages, the
choice of law tradition most prominent among the states40 is the “place
of celebration” rule, or lex loci contractus.41 The essential premise of the
place of celebration rule is that a marriage which is valid where it was
performed or celebrated will be treated as valid everywhere, unless it
violates the “strong public policy” of the state that had “the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage.”42 Aside from the obvious fact that states can choose, revise, or
abandon choice of law methodologies at will, it is this exception, which

36. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
37. See, e.g., Richard S. Madaleno, Jr., MarriageWhether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is
Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 MD. OP. ATT’Y. GEN. 3 (2010).
38. As, for example, during the interstate recognition portion of the Obergefell oral argument. See
supra note 9.
39. For an overview of these dominant methodologies, see REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note
6, at 28. As will be explained infra, there is a more specific method used for marriages.
40. Koppelman describes the Restatement approach as extant in “approximately half the states.”
KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 86; see also Goldman v. Dithrich, 179 So. 715, 717 (1938) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (citing to a collection of cases and observing “[t]he general rule is that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law of the place of its celebration.”).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A marriage
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.”). The state with
the most significant relationship is typically the state where the couple is domiciled. See KOPPELMAN,
supra note 28, at 18. Koppelman’s alternate phrasing nicely captures the Second Restatement’s
requirement that the marriage policy being enforced is that of the state with the most significant
connection to the couple at the time they are wed: “a marriage valid under the law of the most
interested state at the time of the marriage is . . . valid everywhere, even if the parties later move to a
state where that marriage could not have been entered into.” Id. at 86.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). This formulation
encompasses what is sometimes described as an exception to the place of celebration rule for evasive
marriages, where the parties went to the place of celebration for the sole purpose of evading their home
state’s prohibition on their marriage. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 1969.
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allows states to reject out-of-state marriages on public policy grounds,
that distinguishes the ironclad rules of Full Faith and Credit from the
flexibility of state choice of law methodology.43
Nonetheless, the place of the celebration rule, even with its
exception for marriages that violate the “strong public policy” of the
forum state, is typically quite generous in recognizing out of state
marriages. As one treatise reports, “the overwhelming tendency in
American conflicts cases is to validate the marriage.”44 For the public
policy exception to apply, it is not enough that the laws differ, as that
would categorically be the case whenever a question of interstate
marriage recognition reached the choice of law stage.45 Rather, a sister
state’s law must diverge from the forum state’s law in an unusually
offensive way.46 One leading case, In re May’s Estate, illustrates how
sparingly courts have historically treated the exception, even in the face
of a consanguineous relationship from which many contemporary
observers would still recoil.47 There, the high court of New York applied
the place of celebration rule, rather than the public policy exception, in
recognizing a marriage validly contracted in Rhode Island between an
uncle and half-niecein spite of the fact that such marriages were
considered incestuous, void, and indeed criminal under New York law.48
That the court nonetheless declined to invoke the public policy exception,
proceeding instead to recognize the marriage because it was valid where
celebrated, shows the exception’s truly limited reach.
Moreover, under the Restatement formulation, only the state with
the most significant connection to the spouses, typically the couple’s
domicile at the time of the marriage, is entitled to invoke a public policy
exception to refuse recognition.49 A number of states did away with the
exception altogether, adopting a categorical approach to the place of
celebration rule modeled on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The
relevant provision states “All marriages contracted . . . outside this state,
43. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233–34 (1998) (full faith and credit permits no
public policy exception to the recognition of judgments); see also V.L v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020
(2016) (per curiam) (“A State may not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees
with the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits.”).
44. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 402 (3d
ed. 2002).
45. See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So.2d 731, 743 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
46. For a discussion of the difficulty in discerning the exact boundaries of the public policy
exception, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 20–27.
47. In re May’s Estate, 14 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
48. Id. at 6–7.
49. See Sanders, supra note 7, at 101 (observing that the public policy exception is only supposed
to apply to evasive marriages, meaning those in which the couple traveled out of their home state for
the sole purpose of evading their state’s marriage laws). This limitation on the public policy exception
is not universally observed. See Ghassemi, 998 So.2d at 731 (considering the public policy of the state
of Louisiana regarding first cousin marriages even though the parties married in Iran and then moved
to Louisiana).
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that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently validated by
the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of
the parties, are valid in this state.”50 This version of the place of
celebration rule requires recognition of validly contracted interstate
marriages without any exception for the forum state’s public policy
objections.
The overwhelming generosity of the place of celebration rule over
the long course of conflicts history is something to which we will return;
for our immediate purpose, what is essential to understand is that courts
have invoked the public policy exception, refusing to recognize an out-ofstate marriage, without being reversed by the Supreme Court on grounds
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required recognition even where the
place of celebration rule did not.51 In this sense, it is quite true that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause has not yet seemed to require interstate
marriage recognition. To be fair, these cases are well outnumbered by the
cases in which recognition was granted. Further, in very few (if any) of
these non-recognition cases was the Court asked to weigh in on the Full
Faith and Credit question.52 The operative data set, it bears emphasizing,
is vanishingly small.

50. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’r’s on Unif. State Laws
1970). The comment specifies that it “expressly fails to incorporate the ‘strong public policy’ exception
of the Restatement . . . [t]his section will preclude invalidation of many marriages which would have
been invalidated in the past.” According to one inventory, seventeen states have “essentially similar”
language. See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1066–67 (1994). Notably, in the
years between Baehr and Obergefell, most of these states amended their laws to deny recognition to
same-sex marriages, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 179 n.24, a phenomenon of profound relevance
for the animus analysis.
51. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) (refusing to recognize
common law marriage); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 65 (N.J. 1958) (refusing to recognize
underage marriage, although it appears that the marriage wasn’t even valid under Indiana law due to
lack of parental consent (see KOPPELMAN, supra note 28, at 159 n.11)); Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So.
577 (Ala. 1938) (refusing to recognize marriage between one adjudicated guilty of adultery and the
paramour). Ex parte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) is particularly illustrative in that the
Full Faith and Credit claim was specifically raised and rejected by a federal court considering a habeas
petition, challenging a Virginia state criminal conviction for an inter-racial marriage validly contracted
in Washington DC. The district court set forth to assess whether the conviction violated any federal
constitutional provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment, privileges and immunities, and the
Full Faith and Credit clause. Id. at 607. As to the latter, the court ruled that even if marriage certificates
were “public records” within the meaning of the Clause, a proposition the court found “doubtful,” that
the consequence at most would be to render “indisputable the fact of the marriage and of its legality
in the place of contract. Id. To give to public records ‘full faith and credit, is to attribute to them positive
and absolute verity, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied any more than
in the state where they originated.” What it would not do, the court opined, was “convert the fact of
validity there into validity here, contrary to the express local law.” Id. For a persuasive rejection of the
“evidentiary”
view
of
the
Clause,
see
Laycock,
supra
note
11,
at 301–05. Nonetheless, the ruling was never reviewed much less overturned by the Supreme Court.
52. Certiorari was never sought in any of the cases mentioned in the foregoing footnote.
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Nonetheless, in view of this history, a number of influential conflicts
scholars have been quite adamant that “the question of whether or not to
recognize a foreign marriage has almost always been treated as a
question of state law.”53 According to Koppelman and concurring
conflicts scholars, the Full Faith and Credit Clause simply imposes no
duty on states to recognize another state’s marriage license.54 At the risk
of being portrayed “as something close to a dimwit,” other scholars
voiced challenges to the conventional view, emphasized the uniqueness
of marriage in our legal tradition55 and noted that the absence of case law
resolving the Full Faith and Credit question meant that the question
continued to be an open one.56 Indeed, much to everyone’s surprise,
when it came time to consider the interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages, the Justices seemed to agree, at least for an hour or so.
B. A MOMENT OF PROMISE FOR FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?
When the Supreme Court finally announced that it would consider
marriage equality for same-sex couples, the questions presented focused
exclusively on state obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment.57
Even the second question, which explicitly addressed a state’s obligation
to recognize existing marriages performed and licensed in other states,
was phrased to limit the inquiry to recognition obligations arising from
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection
principles.58 Yet during oral argument, the Justices quickly signaled their
interest in the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to questions
of interstate marriage recognition. Counsel for Respondents opened his
remarks by asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require
53. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance, supra note 5, at 354.
54. For a noteworthy critique of the idea that choice of law methodologies lack constitutional
import, see Laycock, supra note 11. Laycock explains that this position inverts our expectations about
the relationship between state law and the Constitution: “For most contemporary choice-of-law
scholars, the Constitution does not control choice of law so much as choice-of-law theory informs the
meaning of the Constitution. Most of them have little or nothing to say about constitutional text,
history, or structure.” And yet in Laycock’s own work there is some mitigation for these scholars, as he
demonstrates that the Supreme Court “has all but abandoned” any effort to identify constitutional
limitations on state choice of law decisions: “It has never considered a Privileges and Immunities
Clause challenge to a state choice-of-law rule, and it has removed most of the content from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.” Laycock, supra note 11, at 257.
55. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 7, at 96; see also RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 44, at 401
(“The peculiar nature of the family’s legal status . . . creates special conflicts problems.”).
56. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 2, at 454.
57. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039, 1040 (2015) (granting petitions for writs of certiorari
limited to the following questions: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a
marriage between two people of the same-sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
recognize a marriage between two people of the same-sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed
and performed out-of-state?).
58. Id. For further discussion of a state’s Fourteenth Amendment obligations to recognize
marriage licenses granted in other states, see Sanders, supra 7, at 95.
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“states with traditional marriage laws to recognize marriages from other
States between two persons of the same-sex.”59 Justice Scalia’s
immediate (and inimitable) response:
What about Article IV? I’m so glad to be able to quote a portion of the
Constitution that actually seems to be relevant. ‘Full faith and credit shall
be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other State.’ Now, why doesn’t that apply?60

In the colloquy that followed, Respondents’ counsel hewed to the
conventional wisdom outlined above, arguing that a state’s obligation
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was primarily to recognize sister
state judgments.61 Justice Scalia pressed counsel on the clause’s plain
text, “Public acts? It would include the act of marrying people, I
assume.”62
Counsel resisted the proposition, and Justice Scalia asked him to
confirm his view that “there’s nothing in the Constitution” that requires
a state to recognize a marriage from a sister state.63 Counsel
characterized that as “essentially correct,” prompting a skeptical
one-word response from Justice Scalia: “Really?”64 Digging in, counsel
took a rather absolutist position, affirming the proposition that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would permit a state to recognize only those
marriages conducted under its own laws.65 Justice Scalia once again
expressed skepticism, at which point the other Justices joined in the
exchange.66 Justice Roberts asked counsel which case he would cite for
the proposition that a state had no obligation to recognize marriages
from other states. Counsel replied initially with some confusion, and
eventually cited Nevada v. Hall.67 Counsel drew from Nevada v. Hall the
principle that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State
to apply another State’s law in violation of its own legitimate public
policy.”68 In doing so, counsel implicitly assumed that a marriage license
from another jurisdiction should be treated in the same fashion as
another state’s statutory laws, a point that would not be explored until
later in the argument.
59. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26.
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26.
61. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 26–27.
62. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27.
63. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27.
64. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27.
65. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27.
66. Counsel referenced Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) and Alaska Packers
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935), for the proposition that there was a
“minimal due process requirement to decline to apply another state’s substantive law.” Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 27. In Pac. Insurance, the Court held that California was not
precluded from imposing greater responsibilities on an employer than a sister state would have done.
67. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
68. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 30.
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Justice Breyer then asked counsel to comment on the types of
policies that a state might invoke in refusing to recognize a marriage from
a sister state, and counsel appeared to posit the existence of some sort of
restriction that would require the policy to qualify as “legitimate.”69 As
he began to elaborate on his view that such a criterion would be satisfied
by a policy that simply sought to “maintain a traditional man-woman
definition of marriage,” Justice Scalia interjected, observing that “none
of this has anything to do with Article IV, right? None of this has anything
to do with Article IV? Full faith and credit, right?”70 Justice Scalia’s
impatience can be read to convey a particular view of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, one that does not turn on substantive policy assessments.71
Counsel’s response was somewhat vague, offering that “full faith and
credit provides the background for the . . . states to be able to assert that,
indeed, we have the right to decline to recognize the out of state
marriage . . .” With the discussion foundering as to the role of interstate
policy assessment in Full Faith and Credit applications, Justice Ginsburg
reintroduced the distinction between judgments and choice of law,
noting that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause there was no allowance
to “reject a judgment from a sister State because you find it offensive to
your policy,” but that “full faith and credit has never been interpreted to
apply to choice of law.”72 Counsel readily agreed.73
Any reprieve, however, was short-lived, as Justice Sotomayor
challenged counsel to acknowledge the “fundamental difference between
creating a marriage and recognizing a marriage.”74 Elaborating, she
observed that states had typically not determined that any deviation from
their own “prerequisites” for marriage constituted a violation of public
policy.75 She asked counsel to justify the highly unusual nature of what
the states had done in targeting same-sex marriage for special rules of
non-recognition.76 Counsel replied, somewhat tautologically, that the
kind of interstate variation in marriage policy that existed “before there
was any idea of same-sex marriage” simply could not be compared to the
phenomenon of same-sex marriage.77 He went on to posit that the place
of celebration rule, with its “liberal” approach to marriage recognition,
69. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 30.
70. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31.
71. For all the perils of making such a claim, it nonetheless brings to mind Justice Jackson’s view
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause: “Its interpretation is less involved than that of most constitutional
provisions with social and political considerations. It is concerned with the techniques of the law. It
serves to coordinate the administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which
exist in our Federation.”
72. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31—32.
73. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32.
74. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32.
75. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32.
76. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 32.
77. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33.
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evolved from a landscape in which “all States are on the same page about
what marriage is . . . every State had the same definition.”78 While
Justice Scalia seemed ready to reject this demonstrably untrue
proposition,79 Justice Sotomayor shifted her focus to the type of legal
construct that best captures the qualities of a marriage decree. She asked
counsel whether he thought “marriage decrees are closer to laws than
they are to judgments?”80 She noted that couples need a judgment to
divorce, and suggested that this contributed to her assessment that a
marriage decree is “much closer to a judgment than it [is] to a law.”81
Counsel explained his contrary view that:
the performing of a marriage is closer to law . . . because, in essence, when
the marriage is performed, all the rights that flow from that State’s laws
evolve to that couple. And it’s different than judgments and so does not
deserve the same kind of treatment that judgments would, under the full
faith and credit jurisprudence . . . .82

After counsel labored to keep marriage out of the protected domain
of judgments, Justice Sotomayor turned her attention to the other
categories itemized in the Clause, and the textual question re-emerged:
what does the Clause instruct with regards to Acts and Records?83
Counsel, echoing the prevailing view discussed above, proffered that
“marriages have always been treated as a conflict of law matter
throughout all the years.”84 Chief Justice Roberts then sought some
historical context, asking Counsel, “[o]utside of the present controversy,
when was the last time Tennessee declined to recognize a marriage from
out of state?” Counsel identified a 1970 marriage involving a stepfather
and a stepdaughter.85
Perhaps uncomfortable with the implications of this chronology,
counsel hastened to explain that there was something “unprecedented”
about States “changing the rules of the game” to include same-sex
couples in the institution of marriage; that before this development,
“States were all playing along with the same definition of marriage.”86
Chief Justice Roberts quickly called the fallacy: “Well, but they weren’t
playing along with the same definition. There have always been
78. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33.
79. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33 (“That’s just not”).
80. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33.
81. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 33—34.
82. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 34.
83. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 34 (“How do you separate out the terms that
Justice Scalia gave you?”).
84. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35. Counsel in fact opined that it was interstate
marriage recognition that actually “gave rise to the entire conflict of law doctrine.” Id. at 35 (citing
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1834)).
85. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35. The reference seems to be to Rhodes
v. McAffee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970).
86. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35.
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distinctions based on age and family relationship. So they weren’t playing
along under the same definition. And still, despite that, it apparently is
quite rare for a State not to recognize an out-of-state marriage.”87
In response, counsel persisted with the idea that there was
something about gender qualifications that was categorically different
than age or familial relationships.88 Counsel asserted, in essence, that
nothing in the history of marriage conflicts could be considered
precedential or illuminating for the challenge of same-sex marriage; that
there was some implied limitation on the range of conflicts that the place
of celebration rule, with its instinct for generosity, was equipped to
handle.89
Justice Alito, noting the posture of the case and the relationship
between the two questions presented,90 observed that the Court would
only reach the question of interstate recognition if it had first decided

87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36.
88.
Refusal to recognize an out of state marriage “was and is quite rare, so long as we’re talking
about what marriage is, so long as we’re talking about the fundamental man and woman
marriage. And thatand that’s my point, is that as soon as States were confronted with the
reality that some States were going to redefine marriage or expand the definition of
marriage to include samesex couples for the first time, then it’s unsurprising that they
would determine, in keeping with their own laws, that they would not recognize those other
States’ marriages inin Tennessee.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36.
89. For a discussion of the intense emotional conflict over miscegenation, see Gregory Michael
Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
119, 149 n.130 (1998) (referencing the Justices’ fear that addressing the anti-miscegenation statutes
“would inflame the political environment in which they sought to implement Brown.”). Note that this
history, focusing on the Justices’ refusal to consider Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), includes a
brief reference to whether the case might be resolved on Full Faith and Credit grounds. Id. at 154. And
although the other interstate recognition conflicts haven’t reached the same degree of national
salience, the language from opinions rejecting out of state marriages as contrary to the state’s strong
public policy reveals an intensity that doesn’t square with Counsel’s suggestion that the same-sex
marriage controversy was the first real discrepancy between states over marriage policy. Take, for
example, Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889), illuminating in part because it involves an
archaic restriction on the remarriage of divorcees that has long since fallen out of useit takes a bit of
effort even to recall this as an area of divergence between states. But the language very stridently
expresses a strong public policy, negating the suggestion that this wasn’t an area of real difference
between the states: The Tennessee Supreme Court found it to be:
[D]ecided state policy not to permit the sensibilities of the innocent and injured husband
or wife, who has been driven by the adultery of his or her consort to the necessity of
obtaining a divorce, to be wounded, nor the public decency to be affronted, by being forced
to witness the continued cohabitation of the adulterous pair, even under the guise of a
subsequent marriage performed in another state for the purpose of avoiding our statute,
and believing that the moral sense of the community is shocked and outraged by such an
exhibition, we will not allow such parties to shield themselves behind a general rule of the
law of marriage, the wisdom and perpetuity of which depends as much upon the judicious
exceptions thereto, as upon the inherent right of the rule itself.
Id. at 308.
90. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 36.
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that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require every state to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. When ruling on the interstate
recognition issue, then, the Court would be operating against a backdrop
in which it had already held that “a State has a sufficient reason for
limiting marriage to oppositesex couples.”91 Justice Alito made clear
that for him, the import of this observation was the prospect of a middle
ground: “So the question is whether there could be something in
between . . . a sufficient reason tofor the State to say, we’re not going
to grant these licenses ourselves, but not a strong enough reason for us
not to recognize a marriage performed out of state. I suppose that’s
possible, isn’t it?”92
Justice Alito’s phrasing suggested something a bit tentative, a sort
of tenuous center that would not hold, and indeed, Counsel rejected the
possibility of a federalist marriage compromise, insisting that “manwoman marriage” was a necessary ingredient of any pro-recognition
regime.93 Otherwise, he opined, couples could simply travel to a state that
permits same-sex couples to get married, and then return to their home
state demanding recognition. Justice Sotomayor pointed out that this
phenomenon was hardly limited to same-sex couples, and that returning
couples evading a variety of home state marriage restrictions have
succeeded in having their marriages recognized under the place of
celebration rule.94 The clear implication was that this dynamic thus failed
to explain why divergence in state marriage policy regarding the gender
composition of the couple was categorically different than other marriage
conflicts in the nation’s history. Counsel reiterated what he viewed as the
self-evident “fundamental distinction,” to which Justice Sotomayor
pushed back: “The prerequisites are always a State’s judgment about
marriage, about what should be a recognized marriage.” Counsel then
attempted a variation on the theme, noting that “Tennessee, Ohio,
Kentucky, and other States with a traditional definition of marriage have

91. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37.
92. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37. It is interesting to note that this is virtually
a mirror image of the question he asked Petitioners’ counsel, the first question asked regarding
Question 2. Justice Alito expressed surprise that the Petitioners’ briefing on Question 2 was “largely a
repetition of the arguments” that Petitioners proffered on Question 1. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 9, at 4–5. He then queried: “I thought the point of Question 2 was whether there would be
a–an obligation to recognize a same-sex marriage entered into in another State where that is lawful
even if the State itself, constitutionally, does not recognize samesex marriage. I thought that’s the
question in Question 2. Is–am I wrong?” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 5.
93. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 5. “Let me be clear. The–the justifications that
have grown over time and the requirement for a strong public policy reason to decline to recognize a
marriage have grown up around the manwoman definition. Our position is that so long as we’re talking
about a marriage from another State that is not the manwoman definition, that it is simply the State’s
interest in maintaining a cohesive and a coherent internal State policy with regard to marriage that
justifies not recognizing those marriages.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 37—38.
94. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 38.
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done nothing here but stand pat.95 They have maintained the status quo.
And yet other States have made the decision, and it certainly is their right
and prerogative to do so, to expand the definition, to redefine the
definition.” Counsel concluded emphatically that to require holdout
states to “recognize those marriages imposes a substantial burden on
their
ability
to
self-govern.”96
Justice Ginsburg noted that this was similar to the landscape
surrounding divorce: “it is odd, isn’t it, that a divorce does become the
decree for the nation? A divorce with proper jurisdiction in one State
must be recognized by every other State, but not the act of marriage.”97
Counsel acknowledged the point, but reiterated the “Court’s recognition
of a distinction between judgments and laws,” asserting that only the
latter was at issue with interstate marriage recognition. Having again
characterized marriage licenses as laws, he proceeded to argue that
requiring interstate recognition “would allow . . . a minority of States to
legislate fundamental State concern about marriage for every other State
quite literally . . . an enormous imposition and an intrusion upon the
State’s ability to decide for itself important public policy.”98 And with
some additional exchanges between counsel and the Justices regarding
the ripple effects of marriage recognition on a state’s other domestic
relations policies, the case was submitted.99
C. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AGAIN RECEDES FROM VIEW
Justice Kennedy, who had shown minimal interest in the interstate
recognition question,100 wrote the historic opinion, blending concepts
95. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39. This is a disputable proposition, in the sense
that many of the states that didn’t permit same-sex couples to marry did more than simply “stand pat”
and eschew the profound policy changes taking place around them. They amended their constitutions
and made specific, single issue exclusions to their choice of law rules. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack,
Same-Sex Marriage and Conflict of Law: The “Other” Constitutional Issue, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
477, 479 n.11 (2015). But putting these reservations aside, it is an assertion with interesting
implicationsthat there is something less robust about interstate marriage recognition when it comes
to policies that change the status quo. It isn’t clear, under the principles that have usually been thought
to inform interstate recognition analysis, why would there be this preference against change.
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39.
97. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39.
98. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 39.
99. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 41–47.
100. Justice Kennedy did not ask a single question of Respondents’ counsel during the argument
on Question 2. He did ask one question of Petitioners’ counsel. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 9, at 9. He reiterated the point that Justice Alito led with, that the Court would only reach
Question 2 if it had first determined that the state had a sufficient reason for excluding same-sex
couples from their marriage regime, and asked Counsel to explain why that reasoning wouldn’t then
carry over to the question of whether a state was required to recognize a valid same-sex marriage from
another state. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 9. Counsel argued that a state would have
to assert different, presumably stronger, reasons for undoing the marital status a couple had already
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drawn from Equal Protection and Due Process to conclude that states
were not permitted to exclude same-sex couples from the institution of
marriage. As had been amply canvassed in the oral argument, this ruling
effectively mooted the interstate recognition issue presented in Question
Two.101 Each of the four dissenting justices wrote their own opinion
objecting to various aspects of the majority’s Fourteenth Amendment
ruling, but none of them endeavored to sketch out an alternative path
illuminated by the guideposts of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.102
When the Court announced its decision, the public reaction was intense,
emotional, and overwhelmingly celebratory,103 although it was certainly
decried and even resisted in some quarters.104 But no one, it might be
surmised, was missing the interstate recognition discussion.
So what, if anything, is there to glean from what we might call the
phantom Full Faith and Credit Clause issues that emerged so
resoundingly, only to disappear from the scene with no further ado? At
the very least, it is fair to describe the Court’s questioning as an
expression of skepticism towards the received wisdom that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is irrelevant to interstate marriage recognition. This
itself is significant, given the conviction with which conflicts scholars
pronounced this very idea. On the contrary, especially in light of the
posture of the case, which formally was focused exclusively on
Fourteenth Amendment issues, the Justices seemed eager to pursue the
intuition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is relevant to questions of
marriage, that the Clause might have something to say about what
appears to be, most of the time, the domain of state choice of law rules,
and that there may be constitutionally significant principles of interstate
recognition apart from whatever the Fourteenth Amendment requires.
The observation that the text of the Clause encompasses more than
just judgments, the notion that there might be something meaningful
about the three distinct legal constructs itemized in the Clause, was taken
seriously rather than treated as a rookie mistake. To the extent that the
Full Faith and Credit doctrine has so far suggested a remarkable
difference between the treatment of judgments and the choice of law
problems that confront, say, a trial court deciding which state’s damages
achieved in another state. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 9.
101. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
102. Id. at 2611—2631 (dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito).
103. See, e.g., Rachel Brody, Views You Can Use: Love Wins, U.S. NEWS (June 26, 2015, 3:45 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2015/06/26/reactions-to-the-supreme-court-legaliz
ing-gay-marriage.
104. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government Out of Marriage” Post Obergefell:
The Ill-Considered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1445 (2016); see also Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1029–32
(2016) (describing both celebratory and condemnatory reactions on social media, including from
political elites).
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cap to apply to a personal injury suit, the discussion included some
meaningful reflection on how best to categorize marriage licenses in such
a binary scheme. While there were certainly further depths to explore,
the Justices pushed counsel on the idea that a couple’s marital status,
while neither the result of nor equivalent to a judgment, is also different
in some fundamental ways from simple choice-of-law problems. At a
minimum, the transcript vindicates the idea that the application of Full
Faith and Credit principles to interstate marriage recognition is truly an
open question, and not a frivolous one. It might, however, be an eternally
ephemeral one, as once again it disappeared without yielding any
answers.
But why? Why is it never the right time to answer these questions,
even during national controversies over marriage policy, when it might
be most useful to know what obligations states owe to one another
regarding marriages they would not have licensed?105 The answer may
have something to do with what some commentators have observed is
the Court’s tendency to follow rather than lead on divisive social issues.
Contrary to the often-romanticized image of a Court at the vanguard of
social change, the Court does not weigh in until public opinion has shifted
in a decisive and discernable direction.106 Jumping in at the midpoint to
105. Consider the eleven years that passed between the Court’s refusal to hear Naim v. Naim, 350
U.S. 891 (1955), concerning Virginia’s refusal to recognize an interracial marriage validly contracted
in North Carolina, and the decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating Virginia’s
anti-miscegenation statutes. In Naim, the Court dodged its obligatory jurisdiction because it simply
wasn’t ready to weigh in on the inflammatory question of inter-racial marriage, not even to address
whether Virginia was required under Full Faith and Credit to recognize such marriages validly
performed in other states. See Naim, 350 U.S. at 891. The Justices discussed this in conference,
apparently, but decided not to pursue it. Eleven years later, by the time the Court got to Loving, it was
ready to go all the way. The query is not why Loving was decided in the way that it was, as anything
else is now inconceivable, but why the Full Faith and Credit question wasn’t taken up during the
interval.
106. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 443
(2005) (noting that “[t]he Justices in Brown did not think that they were creating a movement for
racial reform; they understood that they were working with, not against, historical forces. By the time
the Court struck down school segregation, polls revealed that a narrow majority of Americans
approved of the decision.”); see also R. A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 856–57 (2008):
The U.S. Supreme Court actively avoided addressing the constitutionality of bars on
interracial marriagewidely regarded as the third rail of race relationsfor years, and then
only did so after they had already decided comparatively less controversial issues, such as
those concerning racial segregation in public schools, parks, restaurants, hotels, housing,
transportation, and voting, among other things. By the time the Court decided Loving,
nearly half of the states that had anti-miscegenation laws on their books when Andrea and
Sylvester filed their lawsuit had repealed them. In many respects, some of the hardest work
had already been done.
John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15, 16 (2007):
But, at the time Loving was decided, anti-miscegenation laws were already on their way out.
Only sixteen states still had such laws on the books, although all but twelve had once banned
such marriages. Indeed, Maryland had voluntarily repealed its anti-miscegenation law just
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provide a technocrat’s answer to an emotionally charged problem might
be at odds with the practices of an institution responding in this way.107
Nor was an incrementalist, comity-inspired solution necessarily the
driving motive of those involved in the litigation.108 While a full portrait
of the marriage equality movement is beyond the scope of this Article, a
few basic observations are in order.109 Many of the parties who appeared
before courts raising questions related to same-sex marriage were not
lone litigants seeking merely an adjudication of their own marital
statusthey were part of a coordinated strategy being developed and
advanced by a national civil rights movement. While Full Faith and
Credit Clause claims were raised where applicable,110 a constitutionalized
set of interstate recognition obligations was not the primary goal that
movement advocates were seeking. Its beneficiaries would, obviously, be
a few months before the ruling in Loving was handed down, just as fourteen other states
had done in the fifteen years prior. And, although the Supreme Court had never addressed
the constitutionality of interracial marriage bans prior to Loving, two state courts had
already struck down such laws on constitutional grounds. So while the Supreme Court’s
ruling certainly hastened their demise, the criminalization of interracial marriage had
already suffered a cultural blow that was more wounding than the constitutional one.
107. Josh Blackman & Howard M.Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 42 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 243, 322—23 (2016) (observing that the Justices were intent on “taking the cases when
they thought the country was ready for nationwide same-sex marriage”).
108. Consider one revealing moment that arose during oral argument on Question 2, when Chief
Justice Roberts seemed to have some difficulty envisioning how the Court could rule against
Petitioners on Question 1 and then rule for Petitioners on Question 2. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 9, at 20–21. The concern was some perceived tension between the Court accepting a state’s
reasons for not wanting to grant marriage licenses in the first instance, but then rejecting the state’s
reasons for not wanting to recognize an existing marriage from another state. As others have argued
in various forms, it is possible to answer these questions within the confines of Fourteenth
Amendment principles, by invoking a couple’s liberty interest in retaining their existing marital status
and emphasizing the truly unusual nature of the non-recognition measures taken by states such as
Ohio and Tennessee. It seems quite analytically tenable to conclude that states don’t have to grant
marriage in the first instance if they choose not to, but neither may they disregard the marital status
conferred upon a couple by an equally sovereign sister state. And to the extent there is any real
difficulty there, it is one that would be ameliorated by addressing the interstate recognition problem
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But instead Petitioners’ Counsel was somewhat reluctant to
help the Chief Justice out of his difficulty, conceding that “II think that that actually highlights one
of the problems of trying to decide thethe two cases differently, because, of course, deciding against
Petitioners on Question 1, even if the Court decides in favor of Petitioners on Question 2, would forever
relegate those marriages to second class status and would raise all kinds of questions whether those
marriages could be subjected to laws that are not quite so favorable.” Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 9, at 21. Counsel took a bit of a gamble, sacrificing an opportunity to persuade one of the
likely dissenters as to the interstate recognition issue.
109. For one particularly careful account, see Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering
for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010); see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Marriage
Demosprudence, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1679 (2016); Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum
v. Brien: A “Moment” in History, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27 (2009).
110. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 374
F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (applying abstention and standing doctrines to avoid ruling on federal
constitutional questions); Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d 514 (D.S.C. 2014); Jesty
v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014).
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the very specific subset of same-sex couples who had been able to marry
in one jurisdiction, and then traveled to another. There was also no
guarantee that even this middle ground would be easy to secure. In one
of the earliest cases brought in such a posture, shortly after
Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, the
court rejected the Full Faith and Credit claims with a thinly reasoned
explanation that provided little motivation to replicate the effort in other
courts.111
While there is much to learn from such accounts, I instead focus
here on doctrinal explanations: specifically, a phenomenon I will call
contingent doctrinal evolution. I clarify and elaborate on the core
principles of choice of law doctrine and Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine, to show that the marriages that would most acutely raise Full
Faith and Credit questions are increasingly being covered by these other
doctrines. I also point out that the Full Faith and Credit questions
presented by the issue of same-sex marriage were more complex than is
first apparent, raising distinctive and truly novel questions of
congressional power under Article IV.112 In the next Part I explore these
issues.
II. CONTINGENT DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION
To understand the perennial elision of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in the interstate marriage context, we need to bring into the same
frame the key doctrinal principles that characterize state choice of law
methodology and constitutional marriage jurisprudence respectively.
This is because the Full Faith and Credit question is practically
important in the gap between the “place of celebration” rule (covering
those interstate marriages that states will recognize “voluntarily”
pursuant to their own choice of law methodology) and the area of
marriage decisionmaking that is covered by the Fourteenth Amendment
(consisting of those marriages that states must not only recognize but
instantiate themselves).113 Marriages fall into the gap when states deem
them contrary to public policy, and therefore ineligible for interstate
111. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. The district court made no effort to distinguish marriage
from other areas of state regulation, and in a conclusory assessment of two or three sentences
determined that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id.
112. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468,
1474 (2007) (noting that the Court has not provided much guidance on such issues: “Despite the
mountain of federalism precedent accumulated in the over two hundred years since the Constitution’s
adoption, the Court has scarcely addressed the question of Congress’s powers in the interstate
context.”). Professor Metzger went on to posit that “the issue of whether DOMA’s § 2 exceeds
Congress’s powers may well come before the Supreme Court in the near future.” Id.
113. Note how different this is from saying that interstate recognition questions are choice of law
questions rather than Full Faith and Credit questions; or from the similar assertion that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is satisfied whenever the place of celebration rule is applied.
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recognition under the place of celebration rule, but the Supreme Court
has not (yet) identified a universal state obligation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to grant such licenses in the first place. This gap is where it
really matters whether states are obligated under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to recognize marriages from other states. As this section
shows, that gap is shrinking as the Supreme Court’s animus
jurisprudence continues to expand.
Bringing choice of law principles into the same frame as the
Fourteenth Amendment also gives us another insight into the Court’s
doctrinal path selection: the unusual departures states took from their
ordinary choice of law methodology revealed, perhaps as profoundly as
anything else, the sort of animus that invalidates government
decisionmaking. The specialized rules of non-recognition applied to
same-sex marriages were so clearly marked by animus that the
Fourteenth Amendment made sense as the most appropriate corrective
instrument, even as to the interstate recognition questions that might
have been addressed alternatively through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
We then need to unearth the complicated structural and
institutional questions that pervade this area, teasing out not only the
way that states ought to relate to each other regarding such matters, but
also Congress’ role in managing those relationships, and the role of
federal courts in evaluating how Congress is performing as interstate
relations manager. Congress, by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act,
purported to weigh in on the interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages, using authority assertedly granted to it under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. To rule on the interstate recognition obligations
arising from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court would thus have
had to determine not only what the Clause requires of its own force, but
the permissible scope of congressional activity in this area. Against this
backdrop, the eclipse of the Full Faith and Credit Clause becomes much
easier to understandbut the picture is entirely different than the one
advanced by the conflicts scholars.
A. THE SHRINKING GAP BETWEEN THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION
RULE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As explained above, the ordinary conflicts law approach to interstate
marriage recognition is quite expansive. The public policy exception was
invoked to refuse recognition so rarely that some commentators were
moved to question its existence.114 As Justice Jackson observed as early
114. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of
-Law: Does It Really Exist?, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (1996). As expressed by the courts: the public
policy exception “has been applied rarely and only when the strongest of public policies is implicated.”
Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1 CA-CV 11-0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 12, 2012)
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as 1945, this very generosity “has forestalled pursuit of many questions
as constitutional ones under the full faith and credit clause.”115 The
importance of this dynamic in preventing exposition of the meaning and
demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, while perhaps somewhat
obvious, can hardly be overstated.116 Where states are self-enforcing
comity and stability values through a consistently generous application
of the place of celebration rule, there is no need to determine what the
Full Faith and Credit Clause would demand in the same scenario, and no
viable avenue for such exploration.
Crowding out the Full Faith and Credit Clause from the other
direction is the expanding scope and force of the Fourteenth Amendment
as applied to state marriage policy. Over the past sixty years, the Supreme
Court has become increasingly skeptical of state authority to discriminate
in the provision of marriage licenses, finding such discrimination to
violate Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees. The landmarks in
this area are well known and require little additional exposition here:
through a series of cases including Loving, Zablocki, Turner, Windsor,
and Obergefell, the Court has repeatedly treated marital decisionmaking
as a fundamental right protected against discriminatory and burdensome
government control.117 In requiring states to confer the benefits and
status of marriage upon couples who do not conform to race and gender
prerequisites, the Court’s marriage jurisprudence has blurred the
otherwise
“time-honored distinction” in American constitutional law between
positive rights and negative liberties; while this may have “radical
implications” for the future of substantive due process doctrine, it may
simply reveal a certain “marriage exceptionalism” at work in this line of

(citing Vandever v. Indus. Comm’n, 714 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)) (“The only marriages
validly contracted in another jurisdiction that are denied recognition in Arizona are those involving
the marriage of persons with a certain degree of consanguinity.”).
115. Jackson, supra note 19, at 17–18. Jackson wasn’t speaking exclusively of interstate marriage
recognition, but of the broader tendency among state courts to be “hospitable to pleas that public acts
or decisions of another state be taken into account.” Jackson, supra note 19, at 17–18.
116. It bears noting that Jackson viewed the Full Faith and Credit question in domestic relations
cases as a thorny one: “The whole issue of faith and credit as applied to the law of domestic relations
is difficult, and the books of the Court will not be closed on it for a long time, if ever.” Jackson, supra
note 19, at 14. He observed that most of the time it comes up with regards to judgments; but that in
many such cases it might just have plausibly emerged as a choice of law problem had the issues been
raised earlier in the litigation. Jackson, supra note 19, at 14.
117. Obergefell v. Hodges, 570 U.S. 744 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147,
147 (2015) (describing Obergefell as having “achieved canonical status even as Justice Kennedy read
the result from the bench.”); see also Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage
Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (2016) (“From start to finish, the majority opinion in
Obergefell reads like a love letter to marriage.”).
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cases.118 The entrenchment of marriage’s special status in constitutional
jurisprudence is perhaps best illustrated by the emergent scholarly
literature describing Obergefell as a “conservative” decision119 and
criticizing the prioritization of marriage above other forms of
relationships.120
Yet even as marriage has achieved a perhaps troubling pride of place
in the constitutional order, the doctrinal developments that have pushed
it to the top of the family form hierarchy have a broader reach. As the
Court has been developing the fundamental right to marry, it has also
been refining its approach to animus, clarifying that it is “an independent
constitutional force” fatally tainting the results of majoritarian processes
that target unpopular groups for special burdens and harms.121 The
animus
principle
requires
“a
reasoned,
public-regarding basis” for lawmaking, and will invalidate a “law that
purposefully inflicts injury on its targets out of sheer disdain for them.”122
This has truly powerful implications for the marriage controversies of the
future. Individuals will be able to claim protection from animus-based
state policy without needing to show that their relationships fit neatly
into the facts and reasoning of Obergefell and its predecessors, which
relied
at
least
in
part
on
the
degree
to
which
same-sex couples fit into the traditional template for state-sanctioned
relationships.123 If the challenged policy can be shown to have the
“purpose and effect to disparage and to injure,” the anti-animus principle
will render it invalid.124
One of the most powerful qualities of the anti-animus principle is
that it does not require the same sort of “fit” with relevant precedent that
fundamental rights jurisprudence is thought to demand.125 As scholars
have noted, normative and predictive questions remain about the reach

118. Yoshino, supra note 117, at 168; see also Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA.
L. REV. 1691 (2016).
119. See Leonore Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike Any Other: Obergefell and the
Doctrine of Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124, 124 (2015–2016); see also Clare
Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015).
120. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 117, at 1207–08; Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the
Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).
121. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183,
188 (2013) (positing that “Windsor refined and enlarged the concept of unconstitutional animus”).
122. Id. at 223.
123. As has been noted elsewhere, both Windsor and Obergefell emphasized the extent to which
same-sex couples “shared values and interests . . . with more traditional families.” Id. at 220; see also
Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 925 (2016)
(describing Obergefell as a “triumph of the assimilationist approach” in its “rhetoric about the
universality of marriage and its stories of the named plaintiffs’ shared lives, in sickness and in health
and through the difficulties of chosen commitments, from parenting to military service.” ).
124. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
125. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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of the anti-animus principle.126 Nonetheless, the descriptive case for an
emerging “Windsor Products” jurisprudence, so named to emphasize the
connection to anti-animus concerns expressed as far back as United
States v. Carolene Products,127 is persuasive, and helps explain the
atrophying of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as applied to interstate
marriage recognition. There may not be much daylight between the sort
of sentiment that has qualified as “strong public policy” for choice of law
purposes and the kind that is now prohibited by Fourteenth Amendment
anti-animus principles.
If we look back at the few cases in which out of state marriages were
denied recognition on the grounds of “strong public policy,” we see how
substantially that expression is infused with the type of conclusory,
disparaging sentiment we are now likely to deem invalid, or at least
inadequate to survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.128 This is
manifestly clear with the interracial marriage cases, where the policy
being advanced was the promotion of white supremacy; it requires little
additional exposition to demonstrate the conclusive application of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s central and most important anti-animus
principle.129 But even as to the prohibitions on subsequent remarriage
that succumbed to obsolescence, or the incest and polygamy restrictions
that have not (yet) been invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment,
we see little more in the way of public policy discussion than expressions
of visceral disgust with certain types of relationships.130 Indeed, perhaps
one of the more revealing passages in this set of cases is one in which the
judge seeks to justify the refusal to recognize an interracial marriage by
126. See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 205 (2013) (noting three questions that remained unanswered after
Windsor, including the definition of animus; what would be accepted as evidence of animus; and what
the relationship would be between animus and rational basis review); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel,
Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2073
(2015) (challenging the view that “animus is the critical factor that triggers rational basis with bite.”).
127. See Carpenter, supra note 121, at 183–84 (observing that the roots of anti-animus doctrine
grounding the holding in United States v. Windsor reach back more than seventy years to the concerns
articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938), about
prejudice against “discrete and insular minorities”).
128. See, e.g., Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305, 307 (Tenn. 1889) (considering an out of state
marriage between a divorced woman and her partner in the adulterous affair that ended the marriage,
and expressing “the very pronounced convictions of the people of this State as to the demoralization
and debauchery involved in such alliances”).
129. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (Ala. 1881) (prohibition of interracial marriage
grounded on “sound public policy” of preventing “the amalgamation of the two races, producing a
mongrel population and a degraded civilization”); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (state’s
interest in prohibiting miscegenation is ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ prevent
‘corruption of the blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and the ‘obliteration of racial pride’).
130. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (2010). Nussbaum uses the term “Devlinesque,” after Lord Patrick Devlin, to
characterize arguments that “widespread disgust at a practice is sufficient reason to forbid that
practice through law.” Id. at 8, 82.
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invoking a laundry list of other offensive relationships to which the
purported recognition obligation might then apply. Allow interracial
marriages to go unpunished131 on the grounds that the marriage was valid
where celebrated, the judge argued, and:
we might have in Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son
with the mother, the brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because
they had formed the relations in a State or country where they were not
prohibited. The Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may
establish his harem at the doors of the capitol, and we are without remedy.
Yet none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or more
unnatural than the case before us.132

This lumping together of stigmatized, outcast marriages, without
even the slightest effort to explain the particularized harm the state is
seeking to prevent with each respective prohibition, falls short of what
we now expect states to be able to muster when defending a challenged
marriage policy.
To survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge under any standard
of review, states need to articulate public policy goals more concretely
and ascertainably grounded on “a reasoned, public-regarding basis” than
the appeals to disgust that permeate the applications of the public policy
exception.133 While states might be able to improve on the efforts to
articulate specific legitimate goals with the benefit of sixty years of equal
protection jurisprudence,134 the language in the older cases reminds us
of the sense of revulsion, the idea that some types of relationships are just
self-evidently “revolting,” that underlies a great deal of marriage
controversy. Not only do such sentiments no longer stand alone as
adequate grounds to justify state marriage policy, they more likely do the
oppositeperhaps not quite as a “silver bullet,”135 but as reminders that
courts must search for meaningful ways that a challenged policy actually
advances public welfare.
I do not mean to gloss over the difficult conceptual and predictive
questions that remain open in this area, including the challenge of
distinguishing impermissible animus, typically directed against discrete
and insular minorities,136 from the legitimate proscription of harmful

131. Sometimes, states converted their choice of law rule into a criminal prohibition. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
132. State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (Tenn. 1872).
133. Carpenter, supra note 121, at 224.
134. As we’ll see in the next Subpart, infra Part II.B.
135. Cf. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 889,
930 (2012).
136. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Tobias Wolff’s
work, arguing that prohibitions against same-sex marriage exclude gays and lesbians from marriage
much more categorically than other types of restrictions. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis
in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2248–49 (2005).
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conduct.137 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s protests to the contrary,
animus doctrine in its current form leaves open the possibility of
permissible animusand perhaps state laws prohibiting marriages
between close relatives, as one example, would fall into exactly this
domain.138
The point is simply that at the juncture where states refuse to apply
the place of celebration rule, citing “strong public policy,” we might very
well see the sort of animus that draws in the equal protection guarantee,
even if it is better disguised than in past cases applying the public policy
exception. When we look specifically at the extraordinary lengths to
which states went in refusing recognition to out-of-state same-sex
marriages, we can make an even stronger point. As explained in the next
section, the reactionary suspension of the states’ own choice of law
principles for one class of disfavored marriages falls so squarely in the
animus heartland as to all but demand assessment under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B.

THE ANIMUS OF TOTAL NON-RECOGNITION

To understand how profoundly the nonrecognition of same-sex
marriages was motivated by animus, we must return to the pronounced
generosity of the place of celebration rule as it was applied before the
same-sex marriage controversy. It bears repeating that in the face of
forum law disallowing the marriage in question, “the overwhelming
tendency” nonetheless had been “to validate the marriage.”139 This
longstanding tradition of recognition threw into stark relief the
unprecedented manner in which states targeted same-sex couples for
specialized rules of non-recognition. As lucidly summarized in an amicus
brief filed by family law and conflicts scholars:
The statutory and constitutional bans on recognition of marriages by samesex couples are historically unprecedented in that they create overlapping
and categorical rules rather than allowing for individualized, fact-based
determinations; they shift decision-making power from courts, where it
had largely resided, to the legislature; they draw no distinction between
marriages contracted in a particular state to evade restrictions of the
couple’s home state (“evasive marriages”) and those contracted by
residents of another state; and, finally, they enshrine the rule of nonrecognition in the state’s constitution.140
137. For some thoughts on the difference, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 130, at 57–59, discussing
ways in which sexual behavior might affect the interests of others, and differentiating between coercive
harm, public nuisance type concerns, and merely “constructive disgust”; see also Yoshino, supra note
117, at 167–68 (noting the trouble with a distinction between status and conduct).
138. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (J. Scalia, dissenting) (protesting “that one could
consider certain conduct reprehensiblemurder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to
animalsand could exhibit even “animus” toward such conduct.”).
139. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 44, at 397.
140. See Brief for Family Law and Conflict of Laws Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
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The consequences of this categorical approach, absolutely barring
recognition of any claims arising out of a same-sex relationship, included
scenarios that were downright irrational: courts repeatedly refusing, for
example, to consider divorce petitions filed by same-sex couples because
doing so would “give effect” to the disfavored relationship.141 As Professor
Koppelman observes, “it is odd for a state to oppose same-sex marriages
by making it virtually impossible to end them.”142
What is the most appropriate doctrine with which to evaluate the
extraordinary measures that states took to deny recognition to couples
with valid marriage licenses from other states? On the one hand, it
requires a thorough grounding in state law conflicts precedent, with its
overwhelmingly pro-recognition bent, to appreciate how extraordinary
these measures were. It thus made sense that that during the argument
in Obergefell, we saw discussion of these phenomena in conjunction with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, given the closely intertwined
relationship between the Clause and state choice of law principles.
However, while the unusual hostility directed at one class of disfavored
marriages was threaded through the interstate recognition discussion, it
was difficult to know what relevance it would have for a Full Faith and
Credit analysis. This was in part because marriage recognition under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is uncharted territory, but also because of a
sense that whatever analytical framework that would emerge might not
have a place for the animus concept.
Conversely, we know quite well, with more insight all the time, how
consequential it is under the Fourteenth Amendment when an unpopular
group is targeted for unequal burdens.143 As Professor Koppelman has
observed,
the
stridency
and
totality
of
the
non-recognition policies directed at same-sex couples exceeded even
what the Southern courts of the Jim Crow era had applied to interracial

Plaintiffs-Appellees, De Leon v. Perry, 2014 WL 4796335 *3 (No. 14-50196); see also Brief for Conflict
of Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners and Reversal, Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (listing examples from Louisiana and Virginia),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV5/1
4-556_amicus_pet_conflict.authcheckdam.pdf.
141. See, e.g., In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 666–67 (Tex. App. 2010)
(dismissing a divorce petition on grounds that adjudication on the merits would give effect to a claim
arising from a same-sex marriage, thus violating Texas public policy, expressed in state constitution,
against same-sex marriage); see also Ellen Shapiro, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: The Difficulties of
Obtaining A Same-Sex Divorce, 8 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 208, 210 (2013) (noting that courts in
Nebraska, Indiana, Texas, and Pennsylvania had denied same-sex divorces to couples legally married
in other states); Tracy A. Thomas, Same-Sex Divorce, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 218, 219 (2014) (noting
that Georgia expressly bans same-sex divorce for out-of-state marriages); Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No
Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011).
142. Koppelman, supra note 21, at 105.
143. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (expressing disfavor for “discriminations of
an unusual character”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (same).
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marriages.144 The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, does and probably
should exert a sort of gravitational pull on these questions. In light of the
hostility brought into stark relief by the interstate recognition issue, there
might be something tepid, sterile or unconvincing about a superficially
“neutral”145 marriage federalism grounded primarily in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and policed by strong categorical rules of interstate
recognition.146
Even if the Court were inclined to impose constitutional recognition
requirements as a middle of the road approach to resolving national
marriage controversies, it could do so via Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection and due process principles, an avenue with expressive
qualities that are missing from the Full Faith and Credit domain. To
illustrate, consider the lower court decision that eventually provided the
caption for the consolidated appeals in Obergefell.147 Ohio residents
James Obergefell and John Arthur had traveled to Maryland and were
validly married there, so the only issue in Obergefell’s challenge to Ohio’s
marriage scheme was interstate recognition.148 The same was true for coplaintiff David Michener, who had married in Delaware and sought to
have Ohio issue a death certificate for his late spouse that accurately
reflected their marital status.149 The district court’s determination that
Ohio was constitutionally obligated to honor these out of state marriages
was based entirely on Fourteenth Amendment principles. The district
court first determined that the right to remain married was a

144. Koppelman, supra note 21, at xiv.
145. I put this in scare quotes to demonstrate my understanding that there was no neutral vantage
point here. To rule against the Petitioners would have been to affirmatively and deliberately embrace
a meager, and in my view impoverished, view of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it is possible, at least
in the abstract, to imagine a strictly pro-recognition marriage federalism that is neutral, or at least
silent, as to the policy questions surrounding a state’s marriage regime. When we shift our focus to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, we are reminded that it requires states to accept the judgments of sister
state courts without any independent assessment of underlying substantive policy questions. It is
precisely this doctrinal feature that distinguishes it so consequentially from the place of celebration
rule. A moment during the argument gestures at this; after an extended discussion about what type of
policy objections a state should be required to invoke before refusing to recognize an out of state
marriage, Justice Scalia interjected with “[n]one of this has anything to do with Article IV, right? None
of this has anything to do with Article IV? Full faith and credit, right?” Transcript of Oral Argument at
31, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556). The comment simultaneously revealed
an impatience with the seemingly irresolvable policy questions and a bit of optimism that an analytical
framework grounded in Article IV might offer an escape hatch. The moment was particularly revealing
in light of the fact the Full Faith and Credit Clause, strictly speaking, hadn’t really been teed up for the
Court’s assessment.
146. Reacting to Windsor, scholars characterized the federalist approach as a “way station” on
route to greater articulation of rights. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor
as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 87 (2014).
147. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
148. Id. at 976.
149. Id.
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fundamental right under Due Process,150 and then observed that against
a long-standing practice of applying the place of celebration rule to out
of state marriages, Ohio’s decision to single out same-sex marriages for
non-recognition violated the Equal Protection clause.151 The district court
emphasized that Ohio had “historically and unambiguously provided
that the validity of a marriage is determined by whether it complies with
the law of the jurisdiction where it was celebrated.”152
Ohio had thus recognized a number of out-of-state marriages that
could not have been lawfully solemnized within Ohio, including
marriages between first cousins and marriages involving minors.153 The
district court’s opinion left no room for doubt that the strength and
longevity of Ohio’s pro-recognition tradition underscored the
impermissible animus at work in its singular treatment of same-sex
marriages.154 As animus evolves into a more robust, more mature, and
more developed doctrine,155 it may leave little room for a policy-free
marriage federalism helmed by the demands of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
C. CONGRESS AS AN ADDED COMPLICATION
Resolving the controversy over same-sex marriage entirely through
Fourteenth Amendment principles also allowed the Court to avoid
difficult questions about the appropriate role for Congress in
administering an interstate recognition regime. While the first provision
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks directly to the states, requiring
each to give due effect to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of other states, the second provision, often called the “Effects” clause,
gives Congress the authority to “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”156
150. Id. at 978.
151. Id. at 983–96.
152. Id. at 983.
153. Id.
154. See Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d by DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (four same-sex
couples sought to compel Ohio to recognize their out-of-state marriages; district court emphasized the
consistency with which Ohio had applied the place of celebration rule to heterosexual marriages, even
as to marriages entered into with the intent to evade Ohio marriage law.). The court noted that “prior
to 2004, the Ohio legislature had never passed a law denying recognition to a specific type of marriage
solemnized outside of the state.” Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1040. Full Faith and Credit was mentioned
only in passing, and only with regards to the recognition of an out of state adoption decree. Id. at 1058;
see also Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1027 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (same-sex couple married in
Massachusetts challenging Indiana’s refusal to recognize their marriage; court noted that “as a general
rule,” Indiana recognizes valid marriages performed out of state even when those could not have been
solemnized in Indiana).
155. But see Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 151 (2016) (locating
Obergefell and Windsor in a phenomenon of LGBT exceptionalism).
156. U.S. CONST., art. IV § 1.

AVIEL-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

754

4/6/2018 3:58 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:721

Congress purported to be doing exactly that in the second section of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act, which endeavored to release the states
from any obligation to recognize a same-sex marriage or any claim
arising from one:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same-sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim
arising from such relationship.157

Against this statutory backdrop, any conclusion that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires interstate marriage recognition would have
required engagement with the Effects Clause, determining not only
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of its own accord requires states
to honor sister state marriage licenses, but also whether the Effects
Clause allows Congress to suspend or supersede obligations that states
would have in the absence of congressional action.158 Resolving a Full
Faith and Credit challenge to a state’s refusal to recognize an out of state
marriage would thus have required two distinct analytical steps, neither
of them straightforward. Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
interstate marriage recognition when operating directly on the states,
does Congress have the power under the Effects clause to ordain a
different result?159 As to the first part of the inquiry, the analysis would
require resolution of the questions that emerged during the Obergefell
157. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006)).
158. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 14, at 1496 (“It may be that, nonetheless, giving fair weight to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause precludes Congress from entirely legislating away interstate comity,
but congressional relaxation of the credit due particular classes of laws and judgments does not rise to
that extreme.”); see also Michael DiSiena, Note, Eluding the Grim Reaper: How Section 2 of the
Defense of Marriage Act Could Survive Strict Scrutiny, 19 WASH. & LEE J. C. R. & SOC. JUST. 151, 154
(2012) (“According to the reasoning of DOMA’s drafters, the Effects Clause enables Congress to
contract the extent of the faith and credit requirements imposed on the states by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, even to the point of eliminating them altogether.”).
159. One commentator suggests that this would have been true even after Windsor, in which the
Supreme Court invalidated § 3 of DOMA defining marriage for all federal purposes as composed of
one man and one woman, because the Court didn’t consider § 2, the provision assertedly enacted
pursuant to Congress’s Article IV power. William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage After Windsor, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 150 (2013); see also Bradacs v. Haley, 58 F. Supp. 3d
514, 527 (D.S.C. 2014), appeal dismissed (July 20, 2015) (recognizing that section 2 was not at issue
in Windsor, and therefore “appears to still be an appropriate exercise of Congressional power to
regulate conflicts between the laws of two different States.”). Although it is of course indisputable that
Windsor left intact whatever power Congress thought itself to enjoy under the effects clause, only in
an abstract or provisional way can we say that § 2 continued in full force after Windsor. Congress
cannot, of course, violate Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees even when legislating pursuant
to one of its enumerated powers, and § 2 very likely reflects the same impermissible animus that
invalidated § 3. Scholars made this argument well before Windsor. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman,
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24, 32
(1997).
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oral argument: does the Full Faith and Credit Clause impose upon states
an inflexible obligation to honor the marriage licenses of sister states,
even when the marriage rests on statutory provisions deemed offensive
by the forum state? Is there a public policy exception to the demands of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause that echoes the exception to the place of
celebration rule?160 Are marriage licenses more like judgments, falling
within the settled core of the Clause’s mandate, or like laws, where the
Court has given up trying to establish constitutional parameters for the
application of one state’s laws versus another’s?161
The second step of the inquiry is to determine whether Congress
may set aside what would otherwise be the self-executing demands of
Full Faith and Credit. We know that Congress does not have this power
with regards to Equal Protection, of course,162 but some scholars of
interstate relations, such as Professor Metzger, view the obligations of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as constitutional default rules that
Congress may choose to override, “rather than constituting the
unalterable demands of union.”163 In this view, “[w]hile these provisions
are judicially enforceable against the states, their enforceability is
contingent on the absence of congressional authorization of interstate
discrimination.”164 Against this scholarly backdrop, it is particularly
interesting that Section Two of DOMA was never once mentioned during
the interstate recognition discussion in Obergefell. The Justices seemed
to assume that the judiciary, rather than Congress, would be the
authoritative arbiter of interstate disputes. But again, given the posture
of the interstate recognition issue and its ultimate resolution on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, there is only so much we can
infermaybe the Justices assumed that section 2 would be rendered
invalid by the same animus that had felled section 3 in United States
v. Windsor,165 rather than assuming that an otherwise valid
160. Note that one of the married couples in Obergefell who were seeking sister state recognition
had migratory rather than evasive marriages, as they were domiciled in the jurisdictions where they
married. The discussion didn’t reflect this distinction, even though it is a material one in place of
celebration jurisprudence. Under these circumstances, and especially considering that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause wasn’t even formally presented, it would probably be a stretch to infer any sort of
consensus that the difference between migratory and evasive marriages is or is not relevant for Full
Faith and Credit purposes.
161. Laycock, supra note 11, at 290.
162. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (“Congress does not have the power
to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
163. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1469; see also Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the
Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2210 (2005) (asserting that “no federal
constitutional full faith and credit challenge is availing” with regards to state anti-recognition laws
because of the federal DOMA).
164. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1475.
165. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the provision of the Defense of
Marriage Act defining marriage for all federal purposes as consisting of one man and one woman,
without considering the provision purporting to allow states to refuse recognition to same-sex
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congressional enactment under the Effects Clause was irrelevant to the
interstate recognition issue. In any event, if Professor Metzger is right,
then the Full Faith and Credit Clause is limited in operative effect not
only to the narrow category of marriages that fall between the place of
celebration rule and impermissible animus, as previously described, but
in the further circumscribed area where Congress has not acted.166
Professor Metzger draws on a rich array of sources in support of the
thesis. As a textual matter, she notes that “[a]t the same time as it
prohibits state discrimination in absolute terms, Article IV also grants
Congress broad control over aspects of interstate relations without
expressly subjecting Congress itself to equivalent antidiscrimination
requirements.”167 She notes that “nothing in the phrase ‘the effect
thereof” precludes Congress from determining that certain state laws and
judgments should receive more or less credit than they would absent
such congressional action. Indeed, on its face this language would allow
Congress to prescribe that some laws and judgments should be given no
effect; after all, it is perfectly compatible with standard usage to reply
‘none’ or ‘no effect’ when asked to specify the effect something should
have.”168 Nor do we have guidance from the Court as to these interpretive
questions. As Metzger notes, “little precedent exists on the scope of
Congress’s power under that clause, particularly regarding congressional
power to contract the credit otherwise due state laws and judgments.”169
Turning to normative and functional arguments in support of
congressional authority over interstate relations, Professor Metzger
asserts that allowing Congress to legislate in this role can result in
“positive good.”170 In discussing the idea that “a variety of legitimate
national considerations might lead Congress to allow a state to favor its
own, such as allowing states to protect themselves from “harmful
externalities of other states’ actions,”171 Professor Metzger offers DOMA
as an example, bringing us to the very heart of interstate marriage
conflicts.”172 By referencing the “harmful externalities” imposed on a
state by another state’s decision to recognize a certain type of marriage,
the argument raises, but does not answer, a crucial question: which states
need protection? Do the non-recognition states need protection from the
marriages from other states). See supra note 157.
166. Although we might surmise that where an issue of interstate marriage recognition has become
so salient as to prompt Congress to act, there likely is to be the sort of animus at work that we saw
underlying DOMA and that invalidates government action under the 14th Amendment.
167. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1475–76.
168. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1495.
169. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1493.
170. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501.
171. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501.
172. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 6–10 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2910–14 (stating one purpose of DOMA is to protect states from the effects
of Hawaii’s recognition of same-sex marriage)).
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marriage-expansive states? Or do the marriage-expansive states need
protection from the holdouts? Any regime striving for a coherent
approach to interstate marriage recognition must be grounded upon an
answer to this question, and yet a fully satisfactory answer is missing
from the existing literature, which has not been sufficiently attentive to
the concrete reasons states concern themselves with the institution of
marriage. Appeals to state sovereignty will not get us far, because at best
we have the makings of a zero sum gamemarital status is, of course,
binary, and where two states disagree about whether a particular couple
is married or not, one of the states is deprived of their regulatory
prerogative.173 Whether it is Congress or the Court that picks the winner,
we ought to be satisfied that the winner is the state with the strongest
claim to regulatory authority over the marriages in question. In the next
Part, I explore what this analysis would look like.
D.

THE CENTRAL QUESTION FOR MARRIAGE FEDERALISM

The relief from recognition obligations purportedly conferred by
DOMA is a “legitimate national consideration”174 for Article IV purposes
only if we can agree that it offers protection where protection is needed
in a federal union. This, however, is far from clear. As Professor Gerken
and Ari Holtzblatt describe, “[t]he conventional worry in horizontal
federalism, with its focus on territoriality and sovereignty, is that states
that favor marriage equality will impose that preference on states that
don’t. But it might be just as important to a state to have the same-sex
marriages it has blessed recognized outside of its territory.”175
This crucial insightthat state sovereignty interests run in both
directionsis an important rejoinder to the recurring concern that
mandatory interstate recognition allows one state to set policy for the
entire nation.176 But it also paves the way for an even more foundational
173. As Laycock argues so persuasively, when it comes to interstate disputes, “[s]tate law cannot
supply the answers, because the questions are about interstate relations and no state is empowered to
answer for any other.” Laycock, supra note 11, at 259; see also Jackson, supra note 19, at 30, explaining
the fundamental difference between state choice of law rules and constitutionalized obligations:
[Choice of law rules] extend recognition to foreign statutes or judgments by rules developed
by a free forum as a matter of enlightened self-interest. The constitutional provision
extends recognition on the basis of the interests of the federal union, which supersedes
freedom of individual state action by a compulsory policy of reciprocal rights to demand
and obligations to render faith and credit. States under their voluntary policy may extend
recognition when they could not constitutionally be required to do so; and sometimes, of
course, they have interpreted the law of conflicts to refuse credit when the constitutional
mandate is held to require it.
174. Metzger, supra note 14, at 1501.
175. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism,
113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 78 (2014).
176. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 15 (“We live in a very mobile society,
and people move all the time . . . one state would basically set the policy for the entire nation.”);
see also Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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point: resolving interstate marriage conflicts in a way that is consistent
with federalism values177 requires a much more searching inquiry into the
respective state interests in recognition and non-recognition than has
previously been fully appreciated.178 We ought not to simply assume
some sort of neutralizing symmetry between the interests of the holdout
states and the marriage expansive states, between one state’s interest in
having its marriage determinations recognized by other states and
another state’s interest in refusal.179 The interests are not only unevenly
weighted but not even commensurate in the first place. Furthermore,
such interests are not even articulable without specifying the recurrently
important question of the state to which the couple is most significantly
connected, as that is the starting point for determining which state has
the strongest regulatory claim.180 The only way forward in a faithful
union is twofold: first, to hone in on which state has the most persuasive
claim to regulate the marital status of the couple in question, and second,
to accept that this state’s regulatory authority must travel with the couple
in any regime that claims fidelity to the core principles of both federalism
and marriage.
How do we determine which state has the most persuasive claim to
regulate a particular couple’s marital status? What is easy to see is a
state’s interest in the marital status of its own domiciliaries. Both the case
law and the literature are replete with elaborations on the practical
reasons that a couple’s marital status is an appropriate concern for the
state in which they live, including property rights, financial obligations,
and stability in caretaking arrangements for children.181 This is why the
177. For the view that federalism is best thought of as a means to an end rather than an end in
itself, see Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 175, at 68 n.22.
178. And when we do this, we will further see how completely and categorically different these
interests are than the ones that get weighed in workers’ compensation, tort liability, and other kinds
of interjurisdictional disputes.
179. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 2215 (2005) (discussing a state’s interest in expressing moral condemnation of disfavored
relationships).
180. Id. at 2237 (asserting that “states have a legitimate interest in preventing their domiciliaries
from entering into evasive out-of-state marriages for the purpose of circumventing a prohibition
contained in local law. . . . [M]any courts concluded that evasive marriages directly undermine the
laws of the domiciliary forum and encourage other states to show disrespect for forum policies, to the
detriment of interstate relations.”).
181. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942):
Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of
persons domiciled within its borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large social
importance. Protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital
responsibilities are but a few of commanding problems in the field of domestic relations
with which the state must deal. Thus it is plain that each state, by virtue of its command
over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its
own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there . . .
But see Singer, supra note 2, at 27 (explaining that a place of celebration rule gives much more
predictability in a multistate system than a domicile rule).
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conflicts scholars have been right to focus on issues of domicile when
attempting to determine sensible choice of law rules for interstate
marriage recognition.182 But where they have fallen short is in explaining
how these concrete interests translate into constitutional questions.183 As
Professor Laycock urges, the Full Faith and Credit Clause “assumes the
existence of some basis for recognizing which state’s law applies,” and
then requires that each state act in accordance.184 For marriage disputes,
domicile is a centrally important basis for recognizing which state’s law
applies.”185
If there is consensus about a domicile’s interest in the marital status
of its domiciliaries, the problems arise when a couple’s domicile changes,
because there is then a contest between domiciles. Professor Strasser has
argued persuasively that in a contest over marriage policy between a
couple’s current domicile and their future domiciles, the domicile at the
time the couple was married should prevail.186 His arguments emphasize
the gravity of the personal interests at stake for the couple upon
migration; he does not address whether the first domicile itself has
interests that support the continuance of its regulatory authority over the
couple in question.187 The argument therefore relies largely on
Fourteenth Amendment principles but does not solve the perpetually
elusive federalism puzzle taken on here: whether there is a legitimate
national consideration justifying Congress’s decision to relieve states of
their recognition obligations. To answer that question, we need to push
harder on the set of interests that states have in regulating marriage,
being careful to distinguish between a couple’s interest in the formal
recognition of their relationship and a state’s interest in offering such
182. Silberman, supra note 163.
183. For one important exception, see Gene Shreve, whose original and thought-provoking
argument is that the interests driving conflicts analysis are too readily identifiable as appropriate
constitutional concernstake one step and the entire field would need to be constitutionalized. Gene
R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 272 (1996) (“Constitutional
justifications for Supreme Court intervention so fully partake of the mainstream values of choice of
law that, should the Court begin to give serious weight to the former, it would find no logical stopping
point short of constitutionalizing the entire subject.”).
184. Laycock, supra note 11, at 301. Even Ex Parte Kinney, rejecting all constitutional challenges
to a conviction for violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation prohibition, observed that the case would
have a different tenor if the petitioners had been DC residents when they married, who then moved to
Virginia expecting to retain their marital status. Laycock, supra note 11, at 606. This question of the
jurisdiction with the most significant connection to the couple is revealing, because while we are
accustomed to seeing it in cases applying the place of celebration rule, this judge finds it significant for
federal constitutional purposes. Although he mentions it in analyzing the privileges and immunities
claim, perhaps it is a key to unlock the dilemma of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s application to
marriage licenses.
185. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 606 (1947) (“[M]arriage
looks to domicile.”).
186. Strasser, supra note 30, at 12 (“[T]he domicile is understood to have a great interest in the
marital status of its domiciliaries.”).
187. And not coincidentally, he thus doesn’t pursue Full Faith and Credit questions.
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recognition. The suite of benefits accorded to married couples has been
repeatedly inventoried188 and characterized as “vast,”189 and a great deal
of attention has been lavished on the interest that couples have in
accessing this suite of benefits on equal and nondiscriminatory terms.190
Our purpose here is to hone in on why states bother to create and
administer these regimes in the first place, and then to assess whether
these state interests travel with a couple outside of the state’s territorial
boundaries.191
Paeans to marriage have long been plentiful in our legal culture, but
much of the language is too lofty and idealized to illuminate the real
interests at work.192 To weigh the competing state sovereignty claims we
have to dig a bit deeper to determine what concrete state purposes the
institution serves. An idea developed in one influential account is the
essential place to start: marriage, as the central organizing institution of
family law, is a distributive mechanism for “social goods of an immense
variety of kinds: material resources like money, jobs, nutrition; symbolic
resources like prestige and degradation; psychic resources like
affectional ties, erotic attraction and repulsion . . .”193 By marrying,
individuals sort themselves into arrangements that are thought to signal
to the state the appropriate conditions for the distribution of these social
goods; the central and most essential of these conditions are permanence
and exclusivity. These qualities justify the reciprocal package of rights
and responsibilities that characterize marital status.

188. As described in one influential taxonomy, marriage is comprised of “two characteristics: the
expressive legitimacy that comes from the public institution of marriage; and the panoply of material
benefits, both economic and non-economic, that the marital relationship confers.” Cass R. Sunstein,
The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005).
189. Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 235, 258 (2011) (canvassing “vast” array of privileges and obligations).
190. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), United Sates v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
191. Similarly, I note that others have spoken eloquently about a couple’s interest in keeping their
marriage intact as they move. Given the ease with which those concerns are encompassed within Due
Process and Equal Protection frameworks, I focus here on the state interests in maintaining its
regulatory authority over a couple that moves away. Joseph William Singer,
Same-sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R & C.L 1, 38
(2005) (describing the Court’s view that “it is crucial to have a single answer to the question of whether
a person is or is not married in a federal union.”).
192. Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 41 (2011).
193. Id. at 5–6 (describing the family as “a legally regulated private welfare system.”); see also
Anne L. Alsott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 3 (2010)
(explaining the ways in which family support obligations function as a form of social insurance);
Appleton, supra note 123, at 966 (describing the privatization of dependency as “the essence of family
lawa goal that animates the field and runs through its different elements.”); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM
225, 229 (2004) (“Through marriage, government can delegate to the family some of society’s
collective responsibility for dependency.”).
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Professor Rosenbury emphasizes the state’s interest in the
distribution of material goods, asserting that “the ultimate value
underlying legal recognition of family” is the privatization of dependency.
As she elaborates,
the government affirmatively recognizes certain intimate relationships, to
the exclusion of others, in order to incentivize individuals to privately
address the dependencies that often arise when adults care for children and
for one another . . . . [E]ven as our understandings of family roles and
composition have changed, legal recognition of family status remains
rooted in the privatization of dependency . . . . The government therefore
recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they will serve a private
welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and federal coffers.194

A state’s interest in distributing social goods, managing dependence,
and enforcing legal obligations seems attenuated for couples no longer in
its territorial reach: why not let the next domicile decide whether to
recognize the marriage, or instead risk derogation of familial
responsibility and the ensuing depletion of the state’s coffers? At first
blush it would seem that one domicile has to yield to the next, and that
only the current domicile can claim these kinds of interests. However,
that is to overlook something essential about the nature of marriage and
what is required to effectively advance the state interest in privatized
dependency. The first domicile’s interests are in conferring a permanent
status, or at least one that cannot be undone without a fair amount of
state involvement.195 Perhaps paradoxically, divorce proceedings
confirm the permanence of marital status by requiring couples to engage
the state’s judicial machinery in ways that are not only extensive and
intrusive but anomalous in legal culture.196 Permanence is to marriage
what finality is to judgments: even the departures from the premise
confirm it. It is this permanence, as aspirational as that might seem in
the era of no-fault divorce, which is essential to the meaningful
advancement of the very interests that motivate the state to administer a
marriage regime.
Marriage as a “legally regulated private welfare system” depends on
its supposed permanence.197 This characteristic both provides moral
authority for the state’s explicit favoring of marital relationships (this
couple deserves special benefits because they have made a unique and
enduring commitment to each other) and provides the rough proxy for
194. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835,
1866–67 (2014).
195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (emphasizing the state’s monopoly on the
dissolution of marriage).
196. Even in a post-fault world, the specification of financial and parental responsibility requires
extraordinary state involvement. See Scott, supra note 193, at 229 (“[W]ithin a properly structured
legal framework, even marriages that end in divorce can serve quite effectively to provide a measure
of financial security for dependent family members.”).
197. Halley, supra note 192, at 5–6.
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reliable mutual support that the system depends on (it is more or less
reasonable to assume that this couple’s needs will be met by each other,
rather than the state, because of the exclusive and enduring nature of the
commitment they’ve made to each other).
It is essential to understand that these expectations of permanence
and exclusivity are not only the justifications for the marriage regime;
they are intended, through intense social pressure, to shape the behavior
of the couples within marriage. The permanence expectation is critical to
reinforcing the daily conduct on which the system of privatized
dependence reliesincluding the pooling of resources, the possibility for
specialization in the types of labor that each spouse performs, and the
investment of resources in the family enterprise rather than in pursuing
individual endeavors. To allow that marital status might be contingent,
unpredictable, and vulnerable to uncontrollable forces beyond the
territorial boundaries of the state where the couple makes their home
when they marry is a contraction of the first state’s authority to
instantiate and oversee an institution whose functioning depends on
expectations of permanence.
Perhaps all of this seems somewhat abstract, but the question is how
it fares in contrast to a state’s interest in refusing to recognize the
marriage of a migratory couple. And let us, for now, take the marriage of
an uncle and niece to avoid the specific political valence of interracial or
same-sex marriage. No matter how sincerely, vigorously, even justifiably
the second state may believe that the union in question is deficient,
harmful, or simply ineligible for formal state sanction; no matter how
appropriate the state’s conviction that the union ought not to be an
administrative unit for the private welfare system, the second domicile
cannot prevent the financial, social, sexual, and emotional joinder that
the couple has already undertaken in reliance on the legal status they
achieved in their first domicile. Faced with an existing marriage from
another state, a state is simply not in the position to achieve the
objectives it seeks to pursue when deciding whether to initiate a marriage
in the first place. To borrow from a classic of the domestic relations
literature, the second state does not have a meaningful opportunity to
perform a channeling function for a migratory couple seeking recognition
of their relationship.198 By the time the second state’s legal framework
becomes relevant to the couple they have already entered into the
institution of marriage; their behavior and expectations have been
shaped, at least in part, by that institution’s norms. The second state’s
refusal instead serves an expressive function: it communicates moral
198. Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 496 (1992)
(describing the channeling function as the aspect of family law that encourages and incentivizes people
to enter into and sustain institutions thought of as socially beneficial, and to forego those thought of
as harmful).
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disapproval of the couple’s relationship. The second state’s expressive
interest, in my view, should rank beneath the first state’s interest in the
perpetual reinforcement of the permanence norms that are essential to
the entire regime.
The next step is to see that the differential weight of the respective
state interests is something that matters for horizontal federalism;
having discerned that the first state has a stronger regulatory claim by
virtue of its superior interests, this understanding should inform the
interstate relations issues of Article IV. We are now in a position to return
to the appropriate role for Congress to play. Is Congress so powerful
under the Effects clause of Article IV that it can mandate a choice of law
regime that subordinates the interests of the state with the stronger claim
to regulatory authority?199 I posit that the answer is no, but readers need
not agree with that conclusion to see how laborious this inquiry would
have been, requiring a fairly profound engagement with the nature of
legal marriage and the state interests in regulating it.
Professor Metzger’s discussion reveals a central insight for
horizontal federalism that goes well beyond the question of Congress’s
role in managing interstate relations: that a satisfactory interstate
recognition scheme will be predicated on a clear-eyed assessment of what
the respective state interests are. And the thesis, whether right or wrong,
adds an important dimension to evaluating the view of conflicts scholars
that the application of Full Faith and Credit to interstate marriage
recognition was conclusively a dead letter or a “feckless” simplification.
Instead, it suggests exactly the opposite: perhaps there were simply too
many open questionsthorny ones, implicating the complicated
multilateral relationship between Congress, federal courts, state courts,
and state legislaturesfor this to be the most sensible avenue for the
Court’s resolution to the same-sex marriage controversy.200
Against this backdrop, we have a fresh and entirely different
perspective on the supposed irrelevance of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to questions of interstate marriage recognition. It is true that the
role of the Clause in resolving such disputes has so far been virtually
nonexistent, but not because there is something categorically or
conceptually inapt about it, or because there is any sort of settled
consensus on how marriage licenses fit into what otherwise seems to be
199. See Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations
Conflict Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063 (1999).
200. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1392 (2012):
[T]o constitutionally eliminate the major interstate conflicts, courts would have to
simultaneously hold: (1) that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires interstate recognition
of marriages of its own force, (2) that Congress cannot (pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause) alter that recognition rule, and (3) that this rule cannot be affected by the public
policy exception that states have long exercised.
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a binary scheme dividing laws from judgments and enforcing only the
latter. Rather, the work the Clause might do in managing interstate
marriage recognition has been done by other doctrines, allowing the
Court to avoid complicated questions about Congressional power to
override the default commands of Article IV, and to do so in a way that
lacks sensitivity to the actual weight and nature of the state interests
involved. In light of this past, the question that naturally emerges is
whether the Clause has any possible future. I briefly take this on in the
next Section.
III. FAITHFUL UNIONS OF THE FUTURE
I start from the premise that we are unlikely to have seen the last of
our national controversies over state marriage policy. While we might
have difficulty forecasting when the next major controversy will unfold
or which social movements it will encompass, I nonetheless posit that it
is premature to declare that the constitutionalization of marriage has
reached its endpoint. There would be some hubris in doing so,
considering the speed with which marriage equality claims for same-sex
couples went from facing dismissal for lack of a federal question to
successful articulations of a constitutional right.201 That said, is there
reason to think that the future of Full Faith and Credit will be any
different than its past? Under what conditions would the Clause be
sufficiently useful to overcome the obstacles previously identified to its
application and elaboration?
In light of the approach I have taken so far, it might seem that the
Clause has practical importance in a truly limited category of
marriagesthose that might be ineligible for recognition under the place
of celebration rule as contrary to the forum state’s strong public policy,
but where we do not see the sort of impermissible animus that draws in
the Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees. While that is true, it is
essential to understand that this is something we can identify more
readily in retrospect than ex ante. Unconstitutional animus is not a
terrain with fixed boundariesit is contested, evolving, and responsive
to social change. While the chronology of marriage equality seems to
reinforce the assumption that we can expect the Fourteenth Amendment
to do most of the work in policing state marriage policy, it also reveals
how long that might take, and the potential for backlash to threaten or at
least complicate forward progress.202 We might indeed find it useful to
call upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause while the Fourteenth
Amendment principles are being worked out.

201. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing gay couple’s challenge to exclusionary
marriage law “for want of a substantial federal question”).
202. See Klarman, supra note 106, at 450.
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Consider polygamy, for example. Some have suggested that plural
marriage is the “next frontier” in family law,203 and serious efforts have
been made to examine and critique the currently universal requirement
that no more than two people may join in state-sanctioned matrimony.204
Although reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, there is reason to
believe that polyamorous families are increasingly common.205 Public
opinion on the issue is changing perceptibly,206 reflecting what one
commentator describes as “an increasingly libertarian or laissez-faire
view that many younger Americans take toward sex, marriage, and family
life.”207 In response to a constitutional challenge brought by the
polygamous family portrayed in the television show Sister Wives, Utah
walked back enforcement of its criminal bigamy prohibitions, publicly
announcing that it would only pursue bigamy prosecutions against those
who induced a spouse to marry through misrepresentation or were
suspected of collateral crimes such as fraud or abuse.208 Can we imagine
a future in which a state legalizes plural marriage, and then a migrating
“throuple” might seek to have their marriage recognized in another state?
Difficulties arise immediately in using the issue of plural marriage
to suggest that there may be work to do in the future for Full Faith and
Credit. First, as to what we might call the rule of two, there is absolutely
no divergence in state law at the moment, making the prospect of
interstate recognition issues remote at best. Of course, this was also true
of same-sex marriage until 2003, when Massachusetts became the first
state to strike down prohibitions on same-sex marriage as invalid under
the equality and liberty guarantees of the state constitution. Perhaps we
ought to recognize that momentum was already gathering a few years

203. See MARK GOLDFEDER, LEGALIZING PLURAL MARRIAGE: THE NEXT FRONTIER IN FAMILY LAW
(Brandeis University Press, 2017).
204. See Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be A Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional Right to
Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977 (2015); Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating
Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 54 (2014); Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961
(2010) (considering commercial partnerships as a source of inspiration for the regulatory challenges
of marriage multiplicity); see also Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of
Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 269
(2015).
205. ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR, INSIDE MULTIPLE-PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS
AND FAMILIES xi (2014). She also notes, however, that not all such families would seek legal
formalization of these relationships even if permitted to do so.
206. Nate Carlisle, Poll: American Public Finds Polygamy More Acceptable but Is Still Opposed,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 3, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/blogs/polygamy/2584240155/poll-american-public-finds-polygamy-more (a 2015 Gallup poll found that a mere sixteen percent
of American find polygamy “morally acceptable,” but as one reporter observed, that number was up
from five percent in 2006not a “tidal wave,” but a needle moving perceptibly.).
207. Samantha Allen, Polygamy Is More Popular than Ever, DAILY BEAST (June 2, 2015, 5:15 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/02/polygamy-is-more-popular-than-ever.html.
208. Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016).
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prior, when Vermont decided in 1999 that gay couples could not be
excluded from the set of legal rights and government benefits extended
to heterosexual couples.209 Even if we set the clock back to 1993, prior to
the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin,210 we can see that
interstate recognition issues may arise fairly rapidly out of a landscape
that has not seemed fertile for them. In fact, looking back to 1993
illustrates two seemingly conflicting points: while twenty-two years
seems like a short period for such a major transformation in law and
society, it was plenty of time for a constitutionalized interstate
recognition scheme to have been practically useful.211
The other difficulty is not so much with legal status as with social
practice: how prevalent are the various forms of plural relationships with
marriage-like commitments? More precisely, how prevalent would it be
absent government disapproval of such relationships?212 Every time I
teach Family Law I ask my students whether people they know would
practice plural marriage if the government permitted them to do so.
Students struggle to discern whether the rule of two is foreclosing
arrangements that people would otherwise choose, or rather reflecting
durable and fairly widespread social preferences that exist independently
of law. The answer is probably both, as law and norms reflect and
reinforce each other. The point is that the rule of two strikes people as
less exclusionary than other marriage restrictions simply because of the
perception that fewer people feel meaningfully affected by its
constraints.213 It can seem premature to assess whether polygamy is
likely to be our next national marriage controversy, as we can hardly
imagine the coalition that will call for it. But that puts us right back to the
point about interstate recognition issues arising in ways that feel
unexpected during periods of profound social transformation.214
209. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
210. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (court determining that the law was a gender based
restriction and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny).
211. As one scholar has observed, “in constitutional controversies, public opinion can shift
rapidly.” Otter, supra note 204, at 2042.
212. RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 65 (2015). Noting the prevalence of
traditional, religiously motivated patriarchal polygamy, Otter posits that “the polygynous
relationships in contemporary America are but a subset of the wide range of plural marriages that
would probably exist if states were to legalize polygamy . . .”
213. Arin Greenwood, Who Are ‘The Polyamorists Next Door’? Q & A with Author Elisabeth Sheff,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
5,
2014,
10:43
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/03/05/elisabeth-sheff-polyamory_n_4898961.html. As one expert on polyamorous families
has noted, “poly people are not organized politically around the issue like folks in same-sex
relationships have organized around marriage equality because many polys can marry in dyads and
get the goodies that come with marriage even without poly marriage.”
214. Indeed, one account of marriage equality posits that “the LGBT movement was brought to the
fight for marriage equality by the anticipatory countermobilization of social conservatives who
opposed same-sex marriage before there was a realistic prospect that it would be recognized by the
courts or political actors.” Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an
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Plural marriage is a useful example for our purposes precisely
because the application of Fourteenth Amendment principles does not,
at least from the current vantage point, yield obvious conclusions. While
a thorough assessment of the rule of two’s constitutionality is well beyond
the scope of this project, I offer a few quick observations. First, the rule
of two burdens (at least) three different groups whose demographic and
ideological distance from each other can hardly be overstated:
fundamentalist Mormon sects cast out by the Church of Latter Day
Saints;215 Muslim communities, in turn comprised of immigrants from
West
Africa
and
the
Middle
East216
as
well
as
African-American members of orthodox congregations in urban areas
such as Philadelphia;217 but also avowedly secular groups whose very
interest in plural marriage lies in resisting compulsory sexual norms.218
The first two groups are religious minorities, whose practice of plural
marriage is inextricable from a commitment to traditionalistand
explicitly patriarchalnorms regarding gender and sexuality. The third
is a group we could describe as a sexual minority, allied with and
sympathetic to queer politics,219 whose attitude towards sexual
relationships might be considered, at the very least “rebellious.”220 To
reflect on how little these communities have in common, other than their
rejection of compulsory dyadic marriage, is to understand the challenges
that lie ahead for courts trying to examine whether the rule of two
burdens a “discrete and insular minority” in a way that ought to trigger
heightened scrutiny.221 Will the fact that plural marriage is practiced by
such a diverse set of communities make it more likely to be considered
conduct rather than status?
Perhaps the anti-animus principle can circumvent some of this
difficulty, by focusing the inquiry on the intent to disparage rather than
the social and political profile of the group being burdened; but still,
courts will have to contend with a set of justifications states can offer in
Anticipatory Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 449, 449 (2014).
215. In re Steed, No. 03-08-00235-CV, 2008 WL 2132014 (Tex. App. May 22, 2008).
216. Andrea Useem, What to Expect When You’re Expecting a Co-Wife, SLATE (July 24, 2007,
12:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2170977/; Pauline Bartolone, For These Muslims, Polygamy is
an Option, S. F. GATE (Aug. 5, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/
c/a/2007/08/05/INTBR8OJC1.DTL; Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly
Engage in Polygamy, NPR (May 27, 2008, 12:49 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=90857818.
217. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Philly’s Black Muslims Increasingly Turn to Polygamy, NPR.COM
(May 28, 2008, 10:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90886407.
218. See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 204, at 375.
219. See Aviram & Leachman, supra note 204, at 375.
220. Greenwood, supra note 213 (noting the race and class privilege prevalent among the
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defense of the rule of two that do not convey impermissible animus as
transparently as other prohibitions have done. Among the justifications
scholars have proffered include the concern that polygamy, at least as
practiced in traditionalist religious communities, is inherently
oppressive to women, and that the government is entitled to issue
marriage licenses to relationships that are more likely to advance gender
equality.222 Additional concerns include the administrative hurdles that
would attend the extension of marriage benefits to what one critic calls
“ludicrously large marriages.”223 To be sure, other scholars have labored
passionately to critique these justifications and have done so
persuasively, allowing us a preview of how contested the landscape is and
will likely continue to be. The point here is neither to judge the respective
merit of the two positions on normative grounds nor to make predictive
claims about how the courts will ultimately rule, but to think about what
this means for the range of doctrinal instruments that might be applied
to questions of marriage federalism.
The uncertainty about how the Fourteenth Amendment claims will
be received as they wend their way through state and federal courts, and
the hesitation the Court is likely to manifest in deciding whether and
when to weigh in, suggest an opportunity to consider a constitutionally
obligatory interstate recognition scheme under the purview of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. Especially if Congress sits this one out, allowing
for a direct examination of the Clause’s self-executing requirements
rather than the more challenging assessment of Congress’s override
power, courts might finally find reason to break new ground under
Article IV, setting out recognition obligations that states have to each
other in the face of pervasive disagreement over marriage policy.
CONCLUSION
We live in a moment of intense preoccupation with both marriage
and federalism, one that is likely to persist well beyond the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Obergefell. The decision served to reify marriage as a
site of enormous cultural significance, an appropriate institution within
which to fight over social meaning and its reflection in law. These battles
are fought state by state, against a backdrop of unprecedented geographic
mobility, raising profound questions not only about how states relate to
their own citizens but how states relate to each other. Because if it is true
that states have an interest in marriages they have created, an idea often
invoked but less frequently examined, then interstate marriage

222. See John Witte, Jr., Why Two in One Flesh? The Western Case for Monogamy over
Polygamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 1675 (2015).
223. Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage Law,
120 ETHICS 302, 310 (2010).
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recognition is a matter not only of individual rights but also of state
sovereignty.
And yet, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the constitutional
command that is seemingly most suited to managing marriage
federalism, has never been called into action. This Article first suggests
that this warrants explanation, and then endeavors to provide one. It
offers an account of contingent doctrinal evolution, demonstrating that
the work the Clause might do in regulating interstate marriage
recognition has been done by other doctrines. The Article has shown that
the historically generous place of celebration rule, and the increasingly
robust protection for marriage decision-making provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment, has so far covered most of the terrain.
But it also explains why the Clause might nonetheless be useful for
the marriage controversies of the future. Polygamy, for example, has
already sparked a sustained discussion in the legal scholarship as well as
popular media, with some forcefully arguing that its legalization is
compelled by the same principles of liberty and equality upon which
marriage equality for same-sex couples is grounded. Others however,
have maintained that plural marriage is different and harmful in
constitutionally significant ways, and ought to remain outside of the
realm of state sanctioned marriage. The ultimate resolution of this and
other marriage controversies is far from apparent where we currently
stand. The anti-animus principles that drove forward marriage equality
are highly dynamic; they reflect and respond to social change in an
iterative process that is neither linear, nor predictable, nor
instantaneous. While this unfolds for any given marriage controversy,
over a period that might take decades, we would benefit by having in
place a working interstate recognition scheme with constitutional
parameters.
It is beyond the scope of this project to lay out the precise contours
of such a regime, other than to assert that it should be grounded on a
searching inquiry into the respective state interests at stake. As we
observed when examining Congress’s authority under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, state sovereignty interests run in both directions. Upon
examination, however, these interests are more compelling for the state
that first exercised regulatory authority over a domiciled couple and less
so for a subsequent state to which the couple has moved, suggesting a
reasoned basis to favor the first domicile. The essential point at this stage
is to acknowledge that a constitutionalized set of recognition
obligationsnon-abrogable and not subject to refusal on substantive
policy groundsoffers a lot of promise for strengthening our
commitment to faithful unions, both marital and national.

